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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Interest in the use of identity as a psychological 
concept has increased rapidly in recent years. Although 
the term appeared earlier with approximately its present 
connotations in the psychological literature (Bhattacharyya, 
1931; Amen, 1926), its present use stems primarily from its 
re-introduction by Erikson (1950, 1956).
The current widespread use of the term in several 
disciplines^ may be indicative of more than just popularis 
of the concept. The immediate and general acceptance of
^To suggest the scope of the use of the concept of 
identity across disciplines in the social sciences, the 
■*“ ^  ^
In psychiatry: Szasz (1961); Erikson (1959); Ruesch 
(1961).
In conversion (brainwashing) processes: Lifton (1961); 
Schein (1961).
In education: Brown (1962).
In social work: Wolstad (1961).
In human development: Church (1961); Bios (1962).
In sociology: Stein, Vidich, and White (1960); Lynd 
(1961); Josephson and Josephson (1962).
the term may be more indicative of a relatively independent 
confluence of thought across disciplines in attempting to 
reach more powerful and integrative concepts (Becker, 1962).
The immediate accession of the concept by the several areas 
of inquiry into human behavior may therefore be taken as 
evidence of the integrative conceptual-theoretical significance 
of the concept at our present level of understanding in the 
behavioral sciences.
A term of such manifest importance in the current 
literature provides thereby an intrinsic justification for 
empirical study: "It is almost enough to demonstrate the 
significance of the concept ’identity’ by referring to the 
rapidity with which it has caught on in the social sciences" 
(Rose, 1962, p. 93). Since the re-legitimation of the study 
of self and self-processes by Hilgard (1949) and Cottrell (1950), 
there must certainly remain little need to justify the under­
taking of self-concept related studies in psychology.
However, the present study had as its primary impetus the 
ultimate objective of evaluating the potential integrative 
power of the concept identity, particularly for its conceptual- 
theoretical use in social psychology and its pathologies, 
such as psychiatry (Feibleman, 1962).
In political science: Pye (1962).
In psychology: Jourard (1958); Allport (1961).
In anthropology: Lee (1959); Cohen (1961).
In social psychology: Strauss (1959); Shibutani (1961).
The specific objectives of the study reported here were, 
therefore, the following;
1. To examine the conceptual dimensions of the concept
identity that have arisen from the proliferation of its use,
with a view toward some proposed theoretical clarification.
As Rose (1962) has said:
...the impetus to discovery afforded by the term 
has been so great that its meaning threatens to 
spill over the bounds of analytic utility. Before 
its meaning becomes totally lost by awakening every 
conceivable response in every conceivable investigator 
(like the term 'personality'), the concept must be 
salvaged (p. 93).
While no attempt was made to refine a definition of the term 
and thus restrict its explanatory power (Popper, 1950), some 
understanding of the different orders of phenomena referred 
to by the term seemed necessary to the theoretical useful­
ness of the concept. A careful study of the kinds of phen­
omena various writers have referred to in their use of the 
term was thus expected to lead to some empirical (rather 
than merely theoretical-descriptive) utility for the 
concept.
2. To investigate empirically the usefulness of the 
concept in the assessment and interpretation of human be­
havior. The approach followed here is particularly apropos 
a prototheoretical position such as that of Levy (1963). A 
number of empirical studies of limited scope were carried 
out to test the usefulness of the concept in assessing 
psychological structuring and experience, and the possibilities
for relating inferences about identity to certain behavioral 
performances and psychological experiencing (Gendlin, 1962),
The empirical studies reported here were also carried out 
to explore the possibility of utilizing a test battery as 
an assessment device, and of providing an empirical basis 
for resolving some apparent contradictions in the various 
theoretical formulations of identity.
3, To examine procedurally several methodologies for 
the empirical and clinical investigation of subjective 
identity. The cross-validation of several assessment 
instruments, and an evaluation of those developed specifically 
for this study, were intended to provide a basis for further 
research and the refinement of techniques for apprehending 
various structural and qualitative aspects of psychological 
identity.
The results of the conceptual-analytic survey undertaken 
to satisfy the first basic objective are reported in Chapters 
2 and 3, and serve as a theoretical basis for the balance of 
the study. In Chapters 4 and 5, the research undertaken to 
satisfy the second basic objective of this study is described 
and discussed. That phase of the empirical work concerned 
with the evaluation of assessment instruments devised especially 
for this study is described in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides 
a summary and conclusions, an evaluation of the various 
methodologies utilized in the study, and a brief discussion of 
some implications of the results of this study for further
research. The several test instruments and scales, and 
other relevant procedural detail, are presented in the 
indicated appendixes.
Chapter 2 
The Concept of Identity: J_
As Popper (1950) has suggested, the explanatory power 
of our language may be a function of the imprecision of 
our terms. If this be true, then the abiguity and surplus 
meaning associated with the term identity provide it with 
considerable explanatory power (Strauss, 1959, p. 9). Thus, 
no attempt will be made here to refine or pontificate a 
composite definition or to reconcile apparent inconsistencies; 
rather, the objective is to explore the connotations that 
various writers have given the term in order to dimensionalize 
the concept in the form of derived propositions.
The present widespread use of the term identity reflects 
a confluence of theoretical formulations in several areas 
of inquiry into human behavior. Hence, the plan of this 
and the following chapter is:
1. To present a brief overview of the conceptual- 
theoretical backgrounds from which the present uses of the 
concept identity have emerged;
2. To review the uses of the term by some of its
leading proponents in order to establish a firmer conceptual 
foundation for its empirical use;
3. To derive a set of "propositions” from the analysis 
of the theoretical positions examined;
4. To relate the concept to a number of other concepts 
in psychology in order to provide a broad theoretical con­
text for its empirical use; and
5. To articulate a tentative theoretical formulation 
on which to base the empirical studies undertaken and re­
ported in the following chapters.
The problem of identity, in some form,has been a matter 
of concern in physical and psychological inquiry since the 
days of Parmenides. While this chapter will be devoted 
primarily to an assessment of the state of the concept as it 
is currently employed in psychology, and not to histories of 
identity and related terms vhich are adequately reported 
elsewhere, a cursory indication of some conceptually-related 
backgrounds may be a useful introduction to the reviews of 
specific theoretical positions which follow.
Antecedent and Correlative Concepts
If a conceptually composite theory of identity were to 
be articulated today, it would reflect a heritage from 
philosophy, from self theory, and from ego theory.
In philosophy, concern about identity has been directed
toward three different but related problems: toward the 
problem of the identity of objects to a perceiver (Nyerson,
1962); toward the complementary problem of the identity of the 
perceiver vis-a-vis those objects of the real world (Parker, 
1917; Price-Williams, 1957); and toward the problem of 
accounting for the "mental" (or neurophysiological) dynamics 
of the perceiver's transactions with the "external" world, 
that is, of the nature of the correspondence between external 
and internal realities, as in the so-called "identity theory. 
Such concerns as these, while only indirectly related to the 
concept of identity as it is presently being used in psychology, 
are of considerable metatheoretical interest. For example, 
the notion that a person's identity and his perceptions of his 
world are intimately interrelated emerges from these philo­
sophical questions as a distinct prototheoretical position in 
the psychological use of the concept today (van den Berg,
1955; Levy, 1956).
Current use of the concept identity is obviously also 
related both explicitly and implicitly to self and self-theory 
concepts in a number of direct and tangential ways. These 
relationships can be dealt with most appropriately as a 
part of the assessment of contemporary identity formulations
^The identity theory is obviously an attempt to render 
monistic the dualism or interactionism implied by the 
existence of the first two problems. Cf. Campbell (1957); 
Bertocci (1962). For a psychological treatment, cf. Harvey, 
Hunt, and Schroder (1961, p. 11 ff., p. 62 f f.).
which comprises the major part of this chapter. Of special 
interest in the way of an overview has been the movement 
from apprehending identity as a function of consciousness 
(Locke), or memory (Hume), to its conception as an inter­
personal phenomenon (Baldwin, 1895; Cooley, 1902; Sullivan, 
1953). A similar movement is from the philosophical 
dilemma of self as knower (self-as-process or "ego") vs. 
self as known (self-as-object or "self-concept"), to a con­
cept of self which attempts to incorporate these logically 
antithetical functions (Wylie, 1961; English and English, 
1958; Bertocci, 1962; Dewey and Bentley, 1949).
Historically, the development of self-theories up to 
1930 is adequately handled by Bittner (1932).^ The research 
literature on the self and self-concept, which dates from 
about 1949, is reported by Wylie (1961). An interesting 
review of studies on the formation of the self or ego is 
presented by Sherif and Cantril (1947, Ch. 7); a brief 
recapitulation is available in Sherif (1963, pp. 58-63).
A very useful review of representative views of the self 
and the ego is that of Hall and Lindzey (1957, p. 469 ff.). 
This apparent overlapping of the concepts of self, ego, and 
identity will be dealt with later in this and the following 
chapter.
^An earlier classic statement is Laird (1917). Cf. 
Curtis (1915).
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A third conceptual-terminological development related 
to identity is that of ego in the psychoanalytic (psychic 
apparatus) sense. This concept of ego stems primarily from 
the notion of an autonomous ego which appeared only very 
tentatively in Freud's later work (1950), and found refine­
ment in the work of Hartmann (1958) and Rapaport (1951).
The development of the concept of the autonomous ego is 
reviewed by Wiemers (1957). An evaluative study of the status 
of the concept of ego is offered by Allport (1943).
As may be seen from this brief overview, an apparent 
source of the conceptual confusion attendant upon self and 
ego theories, and earlier conceptions of personal identity, 
has been the characteristic inclination to place behavioral 
determination in the situation (e. g ., role), in the individual, 
or in some formulation which dichotomizes or otherwise implies 
a dialectic between organism/environment. The concept of 
identity, as it becomes refined empirically, may eventually 
provide a means of accomodating these disparate kinds and 
levels of determination within one theoretical perspective.
Specific relationships between the current use of the 
concept identity and these three broad conceptual antecedents 
will be dealt with as they arise in the analysis which follows.
Some Representative Theoretical Formulations 
In this section, a brief analysis is presented of the
11
unique aspects of the meaning attached to the concept of 
identity by representative users of that term in the current 
literature.
Erikson. Since it was Erikson (1950; 1959) who re­
introduced the term identity, the precursory usage is his.
Erikson's formulation of the concept of identity 
(deriving as it did from psychoanalytic ego psychology) is’ 
multiform. At different times, he has given the concept at 
least four basic meanings:
1. A conscious sense of individual identity;
2. An unconscious striving for a continuity of character;
3. A criterion for the silent doings of ego synthesis ; 
and
4. Maintenance of an inner solidarity with a group’s 
ideals and identity.
In so endowing the term with multiform meaning, Erikson in­
cludes within his concept the self as subject and the self as 
object. This surplus meaning with which he has endowed the 
term leads both to a richer conceptualization and to some 
ambiguity and theoretical difficulty.
A distinctive consistency of Erikson*s formulation is 
the manner in which he implicates some correspondence between 
the inner and outer worlds as both the impetus for and the 
objective of a sense of reality. For example, "The sense of 
ego identity...is the accrued confidence that the inner same­
ness and continuity are matched by the sameness and continuity
12
of one's meaning for others..." (1950, p. 228). Yet ego
identity seems not clearly to serve social functions for
Erikson: "Psychologically speaking, a gradually accruing ego
identity is the only safeguard against the anarchy of drives
as well as the autocracy of conscience” (1959, p. 93).
At times, Erikson's use of the term is much like the
notion of ego synthesis in psychoanalytic theory: integration
in youth, he suggests,
is more than the sum of the childhood identifications.
It is the inner capital accrued from all these 
experiences of each successive stage, when successful 
identification led to successful alignment of the 
individual’s basic drives with his endowment and his 
opportunities (1959, p. 89).
Perhaps as a matter of structural necessity, from a psycho­
analytic point of view, this same notion of synthesis or 
integration appears frequently in his formulations: "Ego 
identity...develops out of a gradual integration of all 
identification..." (1959, p. 90).
The assertion just quoted also reflects an additional 
theme which recurs in Erikson's writing: that the develop­
ment of ego identity, while a particular characteristic of 
one stage of development, is a continuing process, and one 
crucial to the achievement of maturity. A further quotation 
will reflect the process character of identity in one of 
Erikson's non-structural formulations:
An increasing sense of identity... is experienced pre- 
consciously as a sense of psychosocial well-being.
Its most obviously concomitants are a feeling of being 
at home in one's body, a sense of 'knowing where one 
is going,' and an inner assuredness of anticipated 
recognition from those who count. Such a sense of 
identity, however, is never gained or maintained 
once and for all (1959, p. 118).
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For Erikson, the term Identity "covers much of what 
has been called the self by a variety of workers"--Mead's 
"self-concept," Sullivan’s "self-system," the "fluctuating 
self-experiences" of Schilder and Federn, Hartmann’s 
"cathected self" and "self-representation" (at least the 
genetic continuity of that function)--and is not unrelated 
to what Freud referred to as "attitudes toward the self"
(1959, pp. 147-48). Throughout, however, Erikson seems 
to have been concerned with a psychosocial equilibrium that 
involves both self-definition and social recognition (each 
as a function of the other). Achieving identity is thus 
an attainment of a sense of the reality of the self within 
social reality. Yet he did not neglect the cognitive 
aspects of identity: "...identity and ideology are two 
aspects of the same process" (1959, p. 157). Thus, for all 
the richness of Erikson’s formulations, he implies considerably 
more than he expressed for the psychological use of the 
concept. He implies a fundamental relationship between 
identity and the capacity for "fully-functioning," and of 
the achievement of identity as a basis for "self-actualizing." 
He observed that "everything that makes for a strong ego 
contributes to its identity" (1959, p. 39). With the 
achievement of a well-defined identity, he postulated a 
coincidence of functional pleasure and actual performance, 
of ego ideal and social role.
At one point or another, Erikson characterizes identity 
as an affective state or condition, a process, a function.
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a quality of structure, a goal and simultaneously the drive 
toward that goal, and as an agent. Such diverse formulations 
are. not conducive to systematic conceptualizations at an 
empirical level. But the ambiguity and surplus meaning with 
which he endowed the concept served well the concept's rapid 
and widespread adoption by other workers.
Wheelis. For Wheelis (1958), personal identity is a 
stable vantage point from which to view experience, a van­
tage point which contemporary man, through his extended aware­
ness, has lost. Wheelis writes from a theme which recurs in 
twentieth-century literature, and in the tracts of cultural 
analysts such as Fromm, Riesman, and RRiyte. A single quota­
tion may best characterize Wheelis's formulation:
Identity is a coherent sense of self. It depends 
upon awareness that one's endeavors and one's life 
make sense, that they are meaningful in the con­
text in which life is lived. It depends also upon 
stable values, and upon the conviction that one's 
actions and values are harmoniously related. It 
is a sense of wholeness, of integration, of knowing 
what is right and what is wrong and of being able 
to choose (p. 19).
As evidenced by the preceding quotation, an essential 
aspect of Wheelis's formulation is the place of value: 
"Identity is founded on value...the beliefs, faiths, and 
ideals which integrate and determine subordinate values.... 
Values determine goals, and goals define identity" (p. 200, 
p. 174). Wheelis also reaffirms Erikson*s emphasis on the 
crucial role of ideology in identity achievement. And,
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following I'lhite (1961), \iheells asserts that indeterminate 
life goals lead to indeterminate identity,
Strauss. Anselm Strauss begins his ’’essay" with the 
following comment; "Identity as a concept is fully as 
elusive as is everyone’s sense of his own personal identity. 
But whatever else it may be, identity is connected with 
the fateful appraisals made of oneself--by oneself and by 
others" (1959, p. 9). Although he does not definitively 
go beyond this brief characterization, Strauss utilizes the 
freedom provided by the ambiguity, vagueness, and diffuseness 
of Erikson’s term to discuss the role of language and inter­
action in identity, the various transformations of identity, 
and the function of group identity: e. g., "...personal 
identity is meshed with group identity..." (p. 173). Of 
particular relevance for the present study is Strauss’’s 
reminder that one’s own behavior must be interpreted in the 
same way that others’ behavior is interpreted, for the 
meaning of neither is self-evident. The legitimacy of this 
point raises a concern which will be dealt with later: that 
a sense of continuity is a function of an individual's 
ascriptions and not of his behavior. The continuity which 
provides the basis for Erikson’s primary formulation of 
identity is not in one’s behavior, but in his assessment of 
his behavior.
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Lynd. Lynd's formulation is more social-psychological 
in nature, and emphasizes social aspects in individual 
orientations. In Lynd, as in Ilheelis, one finds the stress 
on ”l-7ho am I?": "The search for identity... is a social as
well as an individual problem. The kind of answer one gives 
to the question l-Tho am I? depends in part upon how one 
answers the question IVhat is this society--and this world-- 
in which I live?" (1961, pp. 14-15). Lynd’s focus is, as 
the title of her book implies, upon the relatively uncodifi- 
able, pervasive experiences of life which she sees to have "a 
peculiarly close relation to the sense of identity." She 
concentrates particularly on one such experience--that of 
shame. Her basic hypothesis is that "experiences of shame 
if confronted full in the face may throw an unexpected light 
on who one is and point the way toward who one may become" 
(1961, p. 20). The self-conscious experiences of shame, which 
involve the whole self, may thus provide substantial clues 
for the understanding of the sense of identity. The sudden 
awareness that shame affords, of a discrepancy between what 
one appears to be and what one thought one to be, between 
the world one thought one knew and what it appears to be in 
the experience of shame, may provide both a sense of one’s 
past identity and a powerful precursor of his future identity.
The feeling of shame--which may also be seen as a 
falling short of one’s own ideal--is a consequence of the 
failure to achieve expectations of others or of a situation.
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VJhen one’s assumptions of who he is and what the world is 
like are negated or disconfirraed, he experiences the shame 
and anxiety of being unable to trust his answers to the 
question: \\Fho am I? In such "confrontations," in which one 
finds his anchorages undependable, he questions who he is and 
thus becomes what his self-ideal in dialectic with his ex­
periences enable him to become. Becoming oneself is thus 
more than finding one's role or roles. The adoption of a 
socially approved role, when that role does not coincide 
with the deepest desires of the individual, is, according to 
Lynd, a form of depersonalization.
Also of importance in Lynd’s formulations, as in 
Strauss’s, is the manner in which a person names and connotes 
the persons, objects, and institutions of his world. Just 
as the constraints of one’s language may preclude one’s 
ability to communicate his sense of identity, the same 
constraints hold for the investigator. One’s ability to 
encounter life and others with full awareness, however, may 
be a prerequisite to one’s full confrontation of himself-- 
whether verbal or preverbal.
Finally, one’s identity is not something to be 
discovered--as Horney, Fromm, and Sullivan seem sometimes 
to assume— but something to be created in discovery as a 
lifelong endeavor. Experiences of identity are experiences 
of the viability of one’s personal idiom in full awareness 
of the style of life (norms, standards, values) offered or
18
imposed by one’s groups and one’s society. One’s identity
is therefore, for Lynd, more than a composite of one’s
identifications and/or roles. It is an experience of
transcending these in encountering life at a higher level
of awareness and mutuality. Thus the achievement of a
firm sense of identity--v;hile never fully realized--implies
the courage of risking incongruity and inappropriateness in
personal relations:
Openness to relatedness with other persons and the 
search for self-identity are not two problems but 
one dialectical process; as one finds more related­
ness to other persons one discovers more of oneself; 
as the sense of one’s own identity becomes clearer 
and more firmly rooted one can completely go out to 
others (1961, p. 241).
This point appears also in LTieelis (1958):”...the sense of
identity comes from being meaningfully related to others in
an organic community” (p. 51), and in Tournier (1962).
Ruesch. Ruesch’s formulation, if no more immediately
operational, is somewhat more definitive:
In psychiatric terms, identity refers to a person’s 
awareness of what he is, a feeling of being a self- 
contained unit regardless of situation, group, or 
activity. To have an identity means to possess an 
absolute core that defines what is good for self,...
To have an identity implies commitment to long-term 
goals, enabling the individual to minimize activities 
undertaken for reasons of expediency or boredom. 
Identity also means responsibility, above all, 
towards self, compelling an individual to look after 
his own welfare and growth and to avoid all those 
things that are detrimental to body and soul (1961, 
pp. 282-83).
And further: ’’...the sense of identity at any one moment is
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almost synonymous with the sense of integrity, independence, 
and usefulness that an individual possesses” (1961, p. 284). 
Ruesch emphasizes also that what goes into the sense of 
identity is codified within the organism in the analogic 
mode, and that logical, analytical, deductive (and verbal) 
approaches are digital and cannot therefore deal fully with 
human experiences of the analogic mode (1961, p. 283, p. 290).
Consistent with Erikson's multidimensional formulation, 
Ruesch believes that identity can be defined in terms of one’s 
name, age, sex, past experiences, status, roles, and many 
other factors. He is particularly concerned with the 
communication pathologies attendant an ill-defined identity. 
Thus, for Ruesch, identity "subsumes all those processes 
which clarify an individual’s awareness of his functions 
vis-à-vis others and of what he has to expect of himself" 
(1957, p. 93).
Fromm. Fromm postulates that a sense of identity is a 
universal need (1955, p. 69). The simplest formulation of 
identity that Fromm offers is the individual’s experience 
that he is the subject and the agent of his powers. A sense 
of identity based upon that particular experience is, for 
Fromm, a prerequisite to mental health. It is the kind of 
experience which may mean, simply, that "I am what I do"
(1947, p. 72).
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Fromm’s "marketing orientation," in which one as others 
desire him, may be a necessary substitute (since one cannot 
live doubting his identity) for a genuine feeling of identity.
As does Ruesch, Fromm postulates a basic core which is the 
reality behind the word "I" (conceptually similar to Mead’s 
"I"); it is upon this "core" that one bases his conviction of 
his own identity. Failure to have faith in oneself means 
becoming dependent upon others’ approval for a feeling of 
identity whithin oneself.
May. Contrary to the Lynd, Fromm, and other formulations, 
May suggests that absorption in the group is tantamount to 
giving up one’s existence as an identity in its own right 
(1953, p. 29). And in direct contrast to Coffman (1962) and 
Becker (1962), May believes that as performers in life, we cease 
to be persons who live and act as selves. For May, then, one’s 
identity is more than just one’s self--more than the sum of 
the roles one plays. It is the capacity for being aware that 
one plays roles.
Additionally, May proposes that a valid sense of identity 
implies a sense of worth. The person with a firm sense of 
identity will be aware of, and experience fully, his feelings, 
and he will know what he wants in contradistinction to what 
he thinks he should want. The person with a strong sense of 
identity will integrate his life around self-chosen goals. 
Consistent with the position taken by Strauss and Lynd on 
tradition and history. May writes, "One of the distinguishing
21
marks of strength as a self is the capacity to immerse oneself 
in tradition and at the same time be one's own unique self" 
(1953, p. 208). Thus, a firm sense of personal identity 
seems for May to be a function of one's achievements and 
faith in one's unique self.
Bettelheim. Bettelheim (1960) equates identity with the 
subjective conviction of one's uniqueness arrived at through 
choices and decisions made out of inner conviction. One's 
identity derives from and is consonant with a respect for 
one's work and a pleasure in one's competence to carry it out. 
Man achieves a sense of identity through his achievement of 
an autonomous existence. Conformity to the reasonable demands 
of society is thus a creative experience for the person with 
a heightened sense of personal identity. The ability to "be 
oneself" is a matter of personal integration and is not 
entirely dependent on the structure of society (1960, p. 88). 
One achieves integration and a sense of being oneself through 
the exercise of choice.
Schachtel. Schachtel's primary emphasis (1961) is on 
paper-identity as a substitute for authentic identity. He 
equates self-aberration with doubt about and search for 
identity, and sees both as a concomitant of aberration from 
others and from the world around us. Such aberration, which 
precludes a sense of identity, leads one to substitute a
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fixed, reified personality for ongoing psychological processes 
of growth. Looking upon oneself as a thing, and basing one’s 
existence on the support of some reified attribute of that 
thing, precludes the achievement of an authentic identity. 
Consequently, Schachtel stresses the importance (after Goethe) 
of self-knowledge through awareness of one’s relations to 
other people and to the world.
Lifton. The inseparability of belief and identity is
4
Lifton’s (1961) unique focus. Implicitly, what one seeks 
is an ideological self-definition that facilitates self respect, 
Thus, ego-strength is not equivalent to strength of identity 
for Lifton. One may exhibit high ego-strength but remain 
ideologically ill-defined. Lifton equates identity with a 
personal thesis or creed.
Laing. Laing’s formulations (1960; 1962) are similar 
to those of Sullivan, Fromm-Reichmann, and Arieti: the 
absence of a sense of identity is equivalent to a precarious 
ontological security. A person who has such a low threshold 
of security is thus preoccupied with preserving rather than 
gratifying himself. Adequate interpersonal relationships 
therefore are contingent upon a firm sense of one’s own
^Cf. Wm Sargent’s (1957) point that one’s political 
and religious beliefs are the essence of his identity.
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autonomous identity. In psychoanalytic terms, a lack of a 
firm sense of one’s autonomous identity is concomitant with 
the amorphousness or loss of ego boundaries. Laing suggests 
that an authentic identity is two-dimensional and is established 
by a conjunction of identity-for-others and identity-for- 
oneself, the former being "objective," the latter "subjective." 
Following Erikson, Laing postulates the necessity of a 
conjunction of self-other recognition for a sense of identity; 
this he refers to as "complementarity." A purely "subjective” 
identity cannot be "real" (1962, p. 101). One’s uncertainity 
of identity in time leads to a reliance upon spatial (physical) 
identity. In all cases, an ongoing dialectical relationship 
is a prerequisite; one’s identity is a complement to another’s. 
One’s own identity can therefore never be abstracted from 
his identity for others: One’s "identity for himself depends 
to some extent on the identity others ascribe to him, but 
also on the identities he attributes to others, and hence 
on the identity or identities he attributes to the other(s) 
as attributing to him" (1962, p. 75).
A person’s identity is therefore the complex of all 
those aspects of his being whereby he and others identify him. 
Laing also suggests that there may be a qualitative difference 
between knowing who one is and what one is.
While one’s identity, whatever its subsequent vicissitudes 
may be, is originally conferred on one, one’s identity may be 
self-defined by a re-definition of others (1962, p. 85). The
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drive to significance may thus be achieved in phantasy, 
clearly suggesting that there may be a distinct difference 
between what one presumes himself to be (subjective report) 
and what or who he is for others,
Szasz, For Szasz (1961), identification is the underlying 
psychological mechanism of identity.^ Szasz's primary focus, 
however, and the one of most interest to this study, is upon 
the distinction between a conscious, responsible assumption 
of life-role (authentic existence and identity), and passive 
acceptance of one’s life-role as imposed upon oneself (in­
authentic existence and identity). Thus Szasz stresses the 
similarity between identity studies, existential interest in 
authenticity, and semiotical and game-analytic inquiries into 
human behavior (1961, p. 250),
Goffman, Goffman (1959; 1961), like Foote (1951), equates 
identity with role— or, more precisely, with the concatenation 
of roles which one actually performs, A person may thus have 
many selves or many identities— as many as the different roles 
he plays or personages he exhibits. An individual carrying 
out a role is performing; in his performance, he will aLLempL 
to express the identity imputed to him by others. Identities 
are thus game-generated. Such a formulation is not inconsistent
^Gf, Foote (1951); and Winch (1962), For an interesting 
study of identification pathology, see Baumberger (1961),
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with Szasz’s notion of game-regulated behavior, but Szasz’s 
conception is distinguished by his emphasis on the inauthentic­
ity of only playing the roles imposed upon one by society.
Allport. Beginning with the notion of self-continuity 
through memory, Allport (1961) points out that a sense of 
identity is a function of one's awareness of the ”1" as the 
continuing factor in intermittent relationships with the 
world. For Allport, everything that an individual has and 
does is in the way of enhancing his sense of identity— as long 
as those objects and actions serve to differentiate self from 
non-self. Of all the confirming props, a person’s name re­
mains his most important anchorage. One’s identity, for 
Allport, is ultimately his answer to the question, "\«Jho am I?" 
The answer depends upon one’s "directedness" or "intentionality
Allport subrogates identity to one aspect of selfhood 
or the proprium, the others being bodily sense, self-esteem, 
self-image, self-extension, and propriate striving. The 
individual attempts to establish his identity by trying to 
discover his peculiar place in the world.
Becker. For Becker (1961), one’s identity is symbolic 
and is formed through others. One nourishes that identity by 
submitting it for public approval and aggrandizement. Identity 
can only be validated in the social encounter. Not unlike the 
Peters (1958) and Szasz and Goffman formulations, and based 
upon Mead’s and Sullivan’s theoretical positions, Becker sees
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the self-system as a locus composed of internalized social 
rules for behavior (1961, p. 168), but based upon a firm 
feeling of identity. Becker agrees essentially with Fromm 
that identity is the individual’s subjective experiencing that 
he is the agent of his powers. He emphasizes that the only 
standard of veridity for identity is the socially-agreed one. 
Thus, "by performing according to the standards of which 
others approve...one earns an identity" (1961, p. 187). Yet 
one also builds an identity by achieving a sense of mastery.
One measure of a person's sense of identity, suggests 
Becker, is his power to sustain interaction— to conjoin in 
staging a joint cultural self-enhancing ceremony. Like 
Goffman and Foote, Becker sees identity as inseparable from 
role. Yet the self of which one is aware is largely a style 
of performance. Throughout, Becker emphasizes the symbolic, 
as contrasted with the behavioral, determination of identity.
Other Formulations. Stein and Vidich (1960) equate 
identity with personal style. Achieving a personal style 
requires, in their view, a high degree of self-insight, 
particularly into the limiting effects of one’s habitual res­
ponses.
By implication, the "ego" of Sherif and Cantril’s treat­
ment (1947, Ch. 12) is similar to what several writers refer 
to as identity. Their descriptions of the consequences of 
the loss of identity and identity breakdowns are particularly
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apropos. For these authors, identity is roughly equated 
with identification with groups. Fromm, and Klein (1961), 
both offer some support for this position.
Jourard (1958) suggests two ’’definitions" of identity: 
as the subjective experience of "being one's real self," and 
as a person’s beliefs concerning the ways in which other 
people think about him. A person thus reinforces those beliefs 
by behaving consistently in order to maintain that identity.
One’s body image and his clothes— in fact, all aspects 
of his appearance to others--may be significant factors in 
his identity (Schilder, 1935; Stone, 1962). The implication 
here is that one’s identity may be characteristically anchored 
in some apparent aspect of himself (including the objects he 
owns, the part of town in which he lives, etc.), but that 
such external anchorages may at the same time bode ill for 
his ultimate realization of himself. Such external means of 
being identified by others, when taken as the sum-total of 
one’s personal identity, are thematically implied in such 
appraisals as Jung’s (1933), whose "Modern Man in Search of 
a Soul" may be thought of as a man in search of something 
more than the sum of others’ definitions of him.
Foote and Cottrell (1955) believe the pursuit of identity 
to be a positive value "without limit." They also suggest 
that the growth of competence is not separable from the 
elaboration of identity.
The fact that an individual’s identity was defined from
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birth in past ages, but that in contemporary western society 
man must find his own unique identity, is a central point in 
Church’s (1961) formulation; one thus forges his identity as 
he forges the other aspects of his less-structured social 
world.
For Dorsey and Seegers, a firm sense of identity is a 
function of one’s awareness of his essential subjectivity. 
Denial of this ultimate and omnipresent subjectivity vis-a-vis 
the world implies for these writers some degree of self-amnesia; 
"The illusion of self-detachment is the one sign of immaturity 
and of illness" (1959, p. 80).
Some Derived Propositions
To partly "operationalize" the concept of identity, and 
to establish an empirical base for its apprehension and 
assessment, a number of propositions have been derived from 
the theoretical literature on identity. The derivations were 
made on the basis of their commonality and centrality to 
the various writers cited, and on the basis of their relevance 
to the theoretical formulation employed in the research 
reported in the following chapters.
The present set of propositions has been "factored" by 
inspection from an original list of 127 items. It is 
immediately apparent that different orders and levels of 
phenomena are implicit in the statement of the various
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propositions offered. No attempt was made to systematize the 
propositions according to the order or level of phenomena 
involved, other than to remain cognizant of the three basic 
levels of reference— the cognitive-evaluative, the experiential, 
and the behavioral. It is also immediately apparent that these 
propositions are not independent of each other, a condition 
which, when dealing with a conceptually-integrative notion 
such as identity, is to be expected.
Propositions Relative to £ "High," "Stable," "Well- 
Integrated ," "Strong," "Authentic," or "Firm" Sense of Identity.^  
Individuals who may, in keeping with the preceding theoretical 
formulations, be said to manifest a positive, viable sense of 
subjective identity may present the following potentially 
assessable characteristics:
1. An articulated or articulative feeling that life is 
being lived by self initiation rather than simply happening 
to the individual (Erikson), and of knowing who one is and 
where he is going (Wheelis). Such an individual would both 
feel and exhibit evidence of being the agent of his own 
powers (Fromm), and will have achieved or be achieving a
Most of these and the following propositions have been 
derived from the work of the writers dealt with in the 
preceding section; hence specific references are not repeated. 
Where previously uncited writers are drawn upon, specific 
references are provided.
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conscio-us and responsible assumption of a life-roIe--of an 
authentic existence (Szasz).
2. Feelings of, and external or behavioral evidence 
of, autonomy, as contrasted to heteronomy (Bettelheim).
3. Purposiveness, and the possession of definite goals 
toward which the individual is actively working (Wenkart, 1961).
4. Mastery of some culturally worthwhile endeavor 
(Erikson); feelings of, and behavioral evidence of, competency 
(Foote and Cottrell) and productivity (Fromm); a sense of active 
achieving in life (Becker).
5. Feelings and expressions of confidence, and anxiety- 
free expectations of recognition by those who count (Erikson 
and Becker).
6. Evidence of true engagement with others, which is both 
the result and the test of firm identity (Erikson); openness
to relatedness with other persons (Laing); the ability or 
capacity, as demonstrated by one's behavior, to love (in the 
Frommian or Maslovian sense). These conditions imply a clear 
commitment to oneself as a certain kind of person, and the 
ability to reveal oneself to others (Lynd, 1961; Jourard, 1963).
7. Full participation and involvement in the now (Ruesch); 
spontaneity (Erikson), and freedom from debilitating self- 
consciousness (Lynd and Becker).
8. A sense of inner continuity and sameness (Erikson, 
Allport, etc.). A feeling of being a self-contained unit 
regardless of situation, group, or activity (Ruesch).
9. A clear recognition of one’s ultimate subjectivity
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(Dorsey and Seegers), and a self-knowledge or self-awareness 
which enables an internal locus of evaluation (Rogers) that 
provides the basis for the ability to choose between right and 
wrong (Ruesch) with the contingent recognition that there is 
no recourse from making one's choices ultimately alone (May). 
Acceptance of the fact that one's life is one's own responsi­
bility (Lynd). Expressions of knowing what one wants rather 
than wanting what one thinks he should want (May)--e.g., the 
ability to express desires and wishes without moral sanction.
10. A conviction that one's life and endeavors make 
sense (Wheelis), with a concomitant sense of pleasure in 
living, of usefulness, and of general well-being (Wheelis).
11. Congruency between one's actions and one's values 
(Wheelis, May, Rogers). A high degree of coincidence between 
ego ideal and social role (Erikson), and a conjunctiveness 
between subjective identity and public identity (Laing).
12. A personal style or idiom (Bettelheim; Stein and 
Vidich). This characteristic implies an awareness and 
transcendence of role-demand and other social imperatives, 
an awareness of interpersonal relations (Sullivan, 1953), 
and a high degree of insight into the limiting effects of 
habitual or stereotypical responses (Becker).
13. High self-evaluation, self-respect, and self-esteem 
(Becker, Allport, and others).
14. An ability to cope with life metaphorically (Ruesch); 
high tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. A keen sense
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and appreciation of the tragic and the comic in life (Ruesch, 
Iday) ,
15. An awareness of, and ability fully to experience, 
one’s feelings (May; Gendlin, 1962).
Propositions Relative to a "Low,” "Unstable," "Diffuse," 
"Weah," "Inauthentic," or "Infirm" Sense of Identity. 
Individuals who may be said to manifest a negative, impover­
ished sense of subjective identity may present the following 
potentially assessable characteristics:
1, A dis tantiative orientation to reality (Laing, 
Erikson), and a lack of problem-centering (Maslow, 1954).
2, A disintegration of the sense of continuity, and a 
heightened sense of isolation (Erikson). Such uncertainty 
about one’s temporal identity may lead to a reliance on 
spatial identity (Laing).
3, An inability to derive a sense of accomplishment 
from one’s activities, an inability to concentrate, and
an excessive awareness and abhorrence of competitive activities 
(Erikson).
4, A basic mistrust (Erikson).
5, An ability to enter only stereotyped and formalized 
relationships, or seeking intimacy with unlikely partners. 
Little or no capacity for mutual relationships (Erikson). 
Extreme dependence and reliance on paper identity and visible
roles or sociological classifications (Schachtel).
6. Overemphasis of differences from others (Ruesch). 
Expressions of belief that only others have power (Becker).
7. Inability to assume some kind of immortality (Ruesch), 
Attempts to live anonymously or remotely by being "only a 
little man," and by committing oneself to the wisdom of 
society's managers; anxious retreat or depressive helpless­
ness (Bettelheim), with obviously artificial facades for 
different people and different circumstances (Schachtel).
Fear of individuality (Erikson and others).
8. Pervasive indifference (Fromm; Eckhardt, 1961).
9. A "marketing-orientation" to others (Fromm); an 
inability to transcend others’ approval and identifications.
10. Seeking identity with non-human objects, ideas, or 
with Nature (May),
11. A loss of sense of tragedy (May).
12. Self-condemnation in order to achieve a substitute 
sense of worth (May, Szasz),
13. Intellectual-affective dichotomization (Maslow,
Fromm, Gendlin), and other similar either-or orientations 
(Becker),
14. A putting-off of the beginning of "real life":
"Things will be better when,,,"; and a fatalistic attitude 
toward time: "Why start anything when,,," (May).
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15. Too easy internalization of handy ideologies and 
values (Brown, 1962; Symonds, 1951).
Chapter 3 
The Concept of Identity: II
Like any fundamental or integrative concept, identity 
bears some conceptual relationship, or has some theoretical 
implications, for many other concepts and theories. A 
brief indication of some closely related concepts and 
implications for psychological theory may serve to provide 
an additional increment to the present empirical foundations 
of the concept of identity.
Related Concepts and Implications
First, the concept of identity is obviously closely 
related to the concept of self (and self-concept) and to 
the concept of ego, as the latter term is used both in 
psychology and psychoanalysis. It is possible that the further 
development of the concept of identity will clarify the 
similarities and differences in the references of these terms. 
At the present time, some authors subsume identity under the
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concept of self or proprium, as Allport (1961) structures 
those terms. Others subsume the notion of self under that of 
identity (Smith, 1950). It does seem clear at the present 
state of theoretical development that "self" and "ego" are 
connotatively more likely to refer to internal structures 
or qualities— whether static or dynamic. As Snygg and Combs 
(1949) point out, the function of one’s self is to define one’s 
relation to the world. From that perspective, one’s identity 
would be the consequence of that function. Identity would seem 
to be more than the function of relating oneself, however; 
it is construed more as the experience of being related to 
the world in a number of different ways simultaneously. Thus 
identity is a concept connotatively closer to the relation 
between organism and environment than to psychic apparatus 
per se (Peris, Hefferline, and Goodman, 1951; Angyal, 1941).
Identity seems to be conceptually related also to Mead’s 
"I" and to Freud’s original "ich.” The internalization of 
society, on the other hand, which becomes for many writers the 
self or self-system or even the ego, is more nearly related 
to Mead’s "me." There are also definite conceptual similarities 
between the use of identity by some writers and what Horney 
refers to as the "real self" or Fromm as the "true self"
(Munroe, 1955). In its "affective" or experiential dimension, 
identity is related to Federn’s "ego-feeling," and, in other 
respects, to Cattell’s integrative "self-sentiment" or 
McDougall’s "sentiment of self-regard." There are also 
conceptual similarities between identity and the concept of 
"sentiments"in Leighton (1959, Ch.7).
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In its structural connotations, the concept of identity 
is related to Sullivan’s "self-system." A weakness in, or 
disintegration of, the self-system is in turn conceptually 
related to the notion of depersonalization or ego breakdown, 
which many neo-Freudians, such as Federn, Schilder, and 
Symonds (1951) consider to be a factor in every neurosis.?
Loss of identity may thus be related both to the concept of 
depersonalization and to that of "fugue" (Fisher and Joseph, 
1949).
It would appear that the structural connotations of 
identity overlap the concepts of self and ego. Clarification 
will await the results of the increased theoretical attention 
being given the concept of identity. What is apparent at this 
point is that self is used more to refer to the agent of one's 
powers or to what is apprehended "internally" by those powers; 
ego, on the other hand, refers more often to a set of processes 
and to the structure which houses those processes. Identity, 
as most frequently employed, refers to the experience of the 
certitude (and satisfactoriness) of one’s definition vis-a-vis 
himself and his world, and secondarily to the nature or dynamics 
of that definition.
Second, the concept of identity is obviously related to 
theories of cognitive structure and functioning (Festinger,
An interesting explication is evident in the work of 
Bartlett (1932): if memory is a function of self-oriented 
references, depersonalization may be viewed as a breakdown of 
schemata through a dissolution of their personal attributes.
1957; xapaport, 1957; Peak, 1958). The nature of thus 
relationship is not immediately evident. But it appears 
probable that the experiences one has of ’"being himself” and 
of "being w h o l e e t c . ,  are some function of the consonance 
or dissonance, of one’s psychological structures vis-a-vis his 
behavicrs and his cognitive, inputs and processes. Gestalt 
and Lawinian behavioral systems are also conceptual relatives. 
Sarbin (1952) is more explicit when he suggests that one’s 
self is in essence a cognitive structure consisting of one’s 
ideas about various aspects of his being. Such a position 
opens up a fruitful manner of understanding and explaining 
ego-involvement, level of aspiration, and related phenomena 
(Sherif and Cantril, 1947).
Some approaches to psychological structuring which seem 
particularly likel.y to relate and clarify the structural 
aspects of the concept of identity are those of Hebb (1949), 
Deutsch (1960), and of Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960). 
Structures of (or for) behavior are implicitly self-environment 
relational (or transactional) possibilities, whether verbal 
or physical. As these behavioral structures may be affectively 
facilitated or impeded by self-referent structures, one 
experiences himself consciously in relation to the world. It 
may therefore be these "self-consciousnesses” which provide 
the experiential component of identity.
Third, the concept of identity is also related to the 
concepts of role and status. As indicated previously, some 
writers, such as Goffman and Becker, equate identity with role
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and/or status. Role and status are, however, sociological 
designations--he so-and-so a person because he is fulfilling 
such-and-such role--rather than psychological ones relating 
to one's experience of himself in or out of roles. Ruesch*s 
(1957) distinction is typical: "Identity is felt as a permanent, 
somewhat unalterable part of the self ; role is felt as a 
temporary function which is assumed" (p. 94). One’s role or 
status may provide one’s identity for others ; but that level 
of analysis is sociological and should not be confused with 
the psychological level of analysis. (The bridge between the 
two levels in this instance lies in the fact that others’ 
perceptions do have a distinct impact on one’s own perceptions 
of himself.) The distinction made by several writers between 
conventional and interpersonal roles (Shibutani, 1961) is 
helpful, but one’s transcendence of roles through his awareness 
of them and the creativity or personal idiom with which they 
are carried out (cf. Bettelheim and May) may be more a product 
of than a prerequisite to a firm sense of identity.
The distinction Tournier (1957) makes between person and 
personage is helpful. Tournier theorizes that a person is 
first of all his personages or roles or masks (his persona), 
but that his person is something created out of that concatena­
tion of personages— a point utilized in the present empirical 
formulation. Additionally, one is not bound to an acceptance 
of others’ definitions of him; he may make real his phantasies 
of his identity, if he can find (sometimes only in love or in
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psychotherapy) complementarity for his imagined identity 
(Laing, 1962). Just as roles are created as well as discovered, 
identities are created as well as discovered.
Status is likewise a sociological designation, implying 
one's visible "identity’' for others. While such complementari­
ties as statuses may provide one a basis for knowing who he is 
vis-â-vis others, perhaps only a discrepancy between ascribed 
and achieved status will provide him with a consciousness of
who he is vis-l-vis himself.
Fourth, identity is conceptually and occasionally
theoretically related to identification and to definition (in
the broadest sense of that term). For Szasz (1961) and for
Foote (1951) and for Winch (1962), identity is more or less a
summation of one's identifications. It is possible, within this
view, that a sense of identity would be tantamount to bringing
unconscious identifications into conscious awareness (of.
Lynd, 1961). Yet consciousness of one’s identifications (which
conceptually--if paradoxically— remove them from the function
of identifications), may theoretically either heighten or
reduce one's sense of identity. In any event, the selectivity
involved in identifications remains to be explained, and one's
sense of his own identity must be presumed to be a factor in
that selectivity. As Lynd (1961) concludes.
Relations with other persons are something different 
from selective identifications with aspects of one's 
immediate social situation or with wider values.
Both are involved, but neither comprehends all of 
person-to-person relations....The realization of ident­
ity is something more than, and different from 
identifications with parents and with social roles...(pp. 
235, 263, 234).
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Thus one’s identifications, like one’s roles, which 
together form his personage, are at least the basis for one’s 
identity— but, as Ruesch (1961) has warned, in an anologic 
mode.
Fifth, the. concept of identity is conceptually related 
to the notion of alienation, a long-standing theme in social 
analysis. Stemming from Hegel and Marx, the notion of aliena­
tion, which implies a kind of socially-imposed depersonaliza­
tion, has been popularized in modern literature since Dostoyevsky’s 
Notes from the Underground (1864). Conceptually related also 
to the psychological rendering of Durkheim’s anomie and to 
Fromm’s "marketing-orientation,” alienation is behaviorally 
manifested, as in Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, in passivity, 
paralysis, isolation, indecisiveness, and inertia. Other 
correlates are suggested by Dean (1961), by Seeman (1959), 
and by Davids (1955). However, it should be noted that self- 
actualizers (Maslow, 1954) may demonstrate some aspects of 
alienation when the determining criterion is cultural "normalcy." 
Alienation may also refer to the difficulty of basing one’s 
identity on complementary relationships and on broader values 
determined from birth. In this view, alienation is more a 
failure to forge one’s personal idiom in a community of minimum 
status and role formalization. To be "alienated" is thus not 
to be without identity in that sense; to be "alienated"is to 
be unable to accept one’s (and another’s) person under conditions 
of minimum imperatives regarding personage. An "alienated"
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person may have a firm sense of identity (even if not negative), 
whereas a person with a weak or diffuse sense of identity may be 
not at all "alienated."
Sixth, whatever "theory" of identity may ultimately be 
formulated, it will be intimately related at many points to the 
many ramifications of existentialism in psychology. Notions 
such as "authenticity," "encounter," "involvement," "commitment," 
"being," and "becoming" overlap several of the propositions 
derived from the theoretical treatments of the concept of 
identity reviewed in the previous chapter (May, 1951; Maslow,
1962). Many have followed Kierkegaard's lead that the aim of 
life is "to be that self one truly is" (Nixon, 1962), and 
the implications of Tillich's The Courage to Be (1959). An 
interesting attempt to bridge the sociological-existential gap 
is offered by Tiryakian (1962).
The notion of existence is obviously closely related 
conceptually to the notion of subjective identity, but in a 
way or ways that have not as yet been defined. It would seem 
to be most likely that one's subjective identity derives from 
those aspects of his existence by which he may define himself 
in relation to all other aspects of his existence.
Seventh, the concept of identity is also obviously related 
to the increasing ramifications of self-actualization, self- 
realization, and individuation theories (Maslow, 1954 and 1962; 
Allport, 1955; Munroe, 1955; Murphy, 1958; Rogers, 1961).
The implicit underlying question of the ontological vs.
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the episteroological self (Sarbin and Rosenberg, 1955; Hook,
1963) is one which has been dealt with earlier and will be 
clarified in the theoretical formulation which follows. It is 
a choice which need not be made. One’s epistemological self is 
in itself unique. One’s sense of his identity most likely 
emerges from his cognizance, not of the epistemological 
selves which he evidences, or of an ontological self or "core," 
but of a unique configuration of epistemological selves.
The concept of identity has implications for mental health: 
"The healthy individual knows who he is and does not feel 
basic doubts about his inner identity" (Jahoda, 1950; cf. 
Erikson, 1959; Sullivan, 1940), for creativity (Foote and 
Cottrell, 1955; MacKinnon, 1962), for conceptions of autonomy 
and conformity (Fotte and Cottrell, 1955; Laing, 1962; Jahoda, 
1958; Berg and Bass, 1961), and for the syndrome of "authori­
tarianism" or prejudice (Rokeach, 1960),
The theoretical formulation of identity which follows 
also has apparent implications for the field of motivation, for 
personality dynamics and structure theories, for value 
psychologies, interpersonal relations, approaches to attitude 
and attitude change, and for many other social psychological 
topics and problems.
A Tentative Formulation of Identity 
(for Research and Assessment Purposes)
RTiile little is to be gained by legislating a composite.
or eclectic formulation for a theoretical concept, some
conceptual definition is necessary at the point of assessment
or experimentation. Thus, on the basis of the preceding
analysis, a tentative or working formulation has been established
for the purpose of providing a means of assessing and researching
identity. The difficulty and the tenuousness of such an
attempt cannot be disregarded. As James wrote more, than a
half century ago:
The principle of personal identity...has been justly 
regarded as the most puzzling puzzle with which 
psychology has to deal; and whatever view one may 
espouse, one has to hold his position against heavy 
odds....Whatever solution be adopted...we may as 
well make up our minds in advance that it will fail 
to satisfy the majority of those to whom it is addressed 
(1890, p. 350)
Neither can the possibility of defining a conceptual "straw 
man" be disregarded. Laing (1962) has suggested, for example, 
that what we see in current literature and tracts on cultural 
analysis regarding the "quest" for identity may be nothing more
Q
than a shibboleth of our age. But the number of writers in
E.g., "Saul Bellow’s portrait, in The Adventures of 
Augie March, of a Jewish boy leaving the Chicago slums and 
wandering over three continents, not to make a fortune, but 
to find the answer to a simple question: Who am I? The 
question echoes through many recent novels, and it is a good 
question, too, one that helps to convey the puzzled spirit 
of this time..." (Cowley, 1962, p. 7).
various behavioral disciplines who are coming to suggest that
one’s quest for identity is "the very essence of human nature"
(Allport, 1961) is increasing exponentially. The significance
of the. problem for social psychology and psychotherapy, as
expressed by Rogers, among others, attests to the potential
integrative power of the concept in psychology:
Below the level of the problem situation about which 
the individual is complaining--behind the trouble 
with studies, or wife, or employer, or with his own 
uncontrollable or bizarre behavior, or with his 
frightening feelings, lies one central search. It 
seems to me that at bottom each person is ashing,
’VTho am. I, really? How can I get in touch with this 
real self, underlying all my surface behavior? How 
can I become myself?’ (1961, p. 108).
Certainly there can be little doubt, as evidenced by 
the dominant trends in the psychologies of human behavior, 
that an individual’s behavior is in some aspect a function 
of his self-definition apposite that behavior within the 
context of the situation as he views it. The theoretical 
notion of identity is central to this approach to the study 
of human behavior.
In the empirical sciences, a theory or concept is to 
be judged in great part by its usefulness. One objective of 
the following theoretical formulation and the research 
reported in the next two chapters was to test and evaluate 
the usefulness of this concept as an interpretive and research 
tool. Thus the present theoretical formulation was considered 
a necessary prerequisite to that evaluation (Hanson, 1961).
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1. Identity is a construct which refers to the mode of 
one's orientations to his world. The construct also refers 
to one's experiences of those orientations in their 
behavioral manifestations or anticipations, Suzanne Langer 
refers to ’'man's ceaseless quest" for conception and orientation, 
Dewey to his observation that "the characteristic human need is 
for possession and appreciation of the meanings of things,"
One establishes the meaningfulness of his world, and his meaning 
within it, by relating himself to it psychologically. Identity 
refers to the kinds and qualities of those orientations.
In this manner, subjective identity refers to certain 
aspects of one's psychological "environment," analogous to 
what is referred to as the "internal milieu" at the physio­
logical level (Shands, 1960). As such, identity may be no more 
easily quantified or formalized than that "internal milieu,"
Wiess (1958), for example, suggests that it is logically 
impossible to conceptualize these supralogical orders of human 
functioning,
2, Thus, identity, as a construct (i,e., not in its 
manifestations but in its conceptualization) has both an 
evaluative and a noetic dimension, both of which function 
analogically. For example, in terms of the evaluative dimension, 
all of one's values may be related to his self-valuation 
(Lecky, 1945) in some way. Since a person must interpret and 
evaluate his own behavior (or intentions) just as he must 
interpret and evaluate others’ behavior (or their intentions).
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he is able to say, "I am bad,” "That was a good move on my 
part," and so on. To say, on the other hand, "I am John Jones," 
"an executive," etc., is a function of the noetic dimension.
The two dimensions together comprise one’s total psychological 
structure, and serve to distinguish the unique qualitative 
nature of the relationships which comprise that structure--
i.e., the manner in which it is differentiated (Witkin et al., 
1962). It is out of the transactions between these two dimensions 
of identity that emerge one’s experiences of his own identity. 
Thus, functioning with a high degree of congruity between the 
evaluative and the noetic dimensions (including one’s expecta­
tions of others’ reactions) gives rise to a qualitatively 
different experience of self-awareness (Harvey e_t al., 1961,
9
p. 71 ff.) than functioning at a low level of congruity.
3. One has an "identity" only at the sociological level.
The behavioral manifestations of one’s experiences (or antici­
pations of his experiences) of his subjective identity are to 
be inferred from his expectations about his transactions with 
the world implicit in the style of his behavior (i.e., in the 
systematic aspects of his behavior--verbal or nonverbal-- 
cf. Pascal and Jenkins, 1961). One’s style of behavior implies.
Q
Cf. Osgood’s "discontinuities,” Festinger’s "dissonances," 
and Rogers’ "incongruities." Since these cognitive conditions 
may be viewed as a primary basis of self-consciousness, it is 
possible that perfect consonance within the psychological 
system or structure would be tantamount to total unself­
consciousness ,
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in a functional way, his expectations regarding his behavior 
vis-a-vis other persons, society, reality, etc. (Szasz,1961). 
Adler has suggested that there would be no need for an ego 
psychology if an adequate psychology of life-style could be 
developed (Munroe, 1955). Personal style at the cognitive 
level as discussed by Cohen (1960) is also apropos this 
position.
4. One's subjective identity, as one’s self-system, is 
an emergent social phenomenon. What is sometimes referred to 
as one’s ontological self (as contrasted with his epistemo- 
logical self— Sarbin and Rosenberg, 1955; Hook, 1963) can per­
haps better be construed as one’s experiences of the total 
concatenation of his epistemological selves— i.e., as a func­
tion of one’s psychological structure and its unique qualities. 
One creates his identity in much the same way as he creates 
his image or model of the "external" world ; his experiences
of his world vary with his orientations toward it (van den 
Berg, 1955) and the kind of responsibility he is willing to 
assume for these orientations (Dorsey and Seegers, 1959).
Thus a subjective identity refers in part to one’s power 
to determine himself vis-à-vis his world.
5. An essential aspect of one’s subjective identity
^®A useful concept here is that of the biologist 
Thompson, who proposes that each separate structure has its 
unique function, and that functions are thus a function 
of the form or structure from which they emanate (Thompson, 
1952).
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thus the effectance he experiences or anticipates yis-a-vis 
his psychological movement through his life and his world.
This part of the present formulation is not unlike that of self- 
regard or self-valuation, but effectance, which is White’s 
(1959) term, seems much better equipped connotatively to facili­
tate empirical inquiry in the relational or transactional mode.
This effectance aspect is obviously (and necessarily) 
inferrable from one’s actions and behaviors. In the same way 
that we might question the psychological integrity of an 
individual who in spite of his apparent achievements feels 
incompetent, we might also question the efficacy for psycho­
logical health of an individual’s feelings of competence and 
effectance in the absence of any apparent achievements. The 
behavioral component would thus seem to have, as its concomi­
tants, active as opposed to passive orientations, and achieve­
ment as opposed to discursive orientations. Fromm’s point that 
one 2 2  what he does has considerable relevance here (1947,p. 72),
6. One’s subjective identity may be ’’pathologically” 
anchored in a social identity which provides that person a 
freedom of movement beyond the acknowledged efficacy of that 
subjective identity. A lack of incongruity in one’s functioning 
may serve also as a kind of self-anesthesia which precludes the
Cf. Becker (1961): ’’The basic predicate for human action 
is a qualitative feeling of self-value” (p. 163). The observa- 
tTon by Sullivan (1462) tKât there is some disaster to self­
esteem in the etiology of every case of schizophrenia is 
additional evidence for the stress on this aspect.
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self-awareness necessary for the shame experiences (Lynd, 1961) 
that would lead to the forging--through multiple confrontations 
and disconfirn\ations-~of a ’’sound" or achieved (as contrasted 
with an ascribed) subjective identity. Thus a famous bohemian 
artist may ’’ride in’’ on his sociological identity and never 
ask, ’’Who am I?’’ If one’s dominant mode of identity is 
prescriptive, normative, or culturally-valued idiosyncratic,^^ 
the emergent experiences of his subjective identity will likely 
be denied or repressed. As Fromm (1941) has pointed out, many 
normal, adequately functioning individuals do not know (or care) 
who they are, what they want, or what their goals are. A 
person without the possibility of a socially-ascribed dominant 
mode of subjective identity thus must forge one. Marginality 
would therefore be subjective identity-impairing only for those 
persons who define themselves (evaluatively and noetically) in 
terms of sociological categories or conventional roles.
On the other hand, one’s strivings for identity may be 
determined by his idealized image (Horney, 1950), To take this 
ideal self as one’s identity goal may be as self-destructive 
as taking one's social identifications as an identity goal 
(Lynd, 1961). While we may not as yet have conceptual logic 
for apprehending systemic interdependencies, it would seem likely 
that the conjunction of personal-public identity— given
^^Sex-identities, socio-economic identities, beauty, 
status, clothes, role, race, prestigious occupations, possessions, 
or notorious performances, are representative, of the range of 
possibilities.
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congruities at both Ievels--is maximally conducive to a viable 
subjective identity.
7. One’s awareness of himself thus functionally relates 
to the multiplicity and multidimensionality of his self-defini­
tions; since the efficacy of one’s subjective identity depends 
first upon his apprehension of how he is determined, such 
awareness is a prerequisite to a viable subjective identity. 
(I.e., it is only to the extent that one is aware of how he
is determined that he can transcend the self-consciousness that 
emerges from discontinuities in his psychological structure- 
functioning.) One can thus take his subjective identity from 
any psychological source (identification, internalized roles 
and validation in them, negative or dominant modes of identifi­
cation by others, physical or virtuoso characteristics, etc.). 
But the viability of that subjective identity depends upon the 
ubiquitousness of one’s self-determinations. This point is 
well-put by Schrader: "A necessary condition for my awareness 
of an object is the multiple determination of myself in 
relation to the object. Similarly, my self-consciousness 
requires and is constituted by the various ways in which I 
determine myself" (1960, p. 47). Thus, the multiple determina­
tion of oneself in relation to social roles, for example, would 
increase and enhance one’s possibilities for self-awareness 
and hence for the viability of his subjective identity (through 
what might be termed "role virtuosity").
8. To the extent, then, that one’s sources of subjective
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identity confirmations are ’’external” to hia. (i.e., are other 
persons), his subjective identity is neither functional (to its 
underlying structures),proteiform, nor multivalent, all 
characteristics of a viable sense, of subjective identity. Dis­
conf irtnation is a term that seems to be inapplicable to a 
person whose behavior stems from an inner congruity. Thus 
temporary or chronic conditions of disorientation or subjective 
identity ’’loss” are most likely to occur following conditions 
of sensory deprivation (’'disconfirmation” of psychological 
structures) or of evaluative deprivation (either personal or 
social--but subjective). A ’’low” sense of identity would thus 
be, contrarily, a qualitative experiencing of incongruity 
between or within the evaluative and noetic dimensions of one's 
psychological structure vis-a-vis the expectations with which 
he endows his behavior (the ’’function” of his behavior).
9. It is clear from this and the preceding discussion 
that subjective identity is not a unidimensional concept--at 
least in terms of conventional psychological dimensions. 
Neither the source nor the structure nor the experience nor the 
behavioral manifestation of subjective identity are specific 
differentia for prediction; as Witkin and his co-workers (1962) 
have reported, for example, emotionally cold, isolated, over­
intellectual children were found to have as developed a sense
^^Erikson’s (1959) ’’negative identity” might be thus 
characterized.
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of separate identity as emotionally warm, empathie children. 
Identity "problems,” of the sort referred to by Rogers (1961), 
and of the sort popularized in modern literature, may refer to 
cognitive-evaluative dissonances rather than to alienation or 
disorientation or personal anomie. An individual who has always 
"known” who he is, regardless of the basis of that identity and 
regardless of the justifiability of that identity (Mixon, 1962), 
may present a "healthier” clinical assessment than an individual 
who is presently concerned with the problem of "who" he is.
The latter individual may reach a more or less functional (for 
him) conclusion than the individual who has never wondered about 
his identity. As with status, then, we might fruitfully dis­
criminate between achieved and ascribed identity. Either the 
process of achievement or the loss of ascription may set the 
conditions for identity pathologies. "Becoming" (Maslow, 1962) 
is thus a phenomenon of identity achievement, "being" of 
identity ascription, Ifhile both refer to relations between 
self and world, or to orientations or behavioral intentions, 
there may be significant qualitative differences at the cognitive- 
evaluative, experiential, and the behavioral levels which are 
not presently distinguishable.
Certainly, this tentative formulation of so complex an 
integrative concept as identity cannot be taken as an attempt to 
formalize a theory of identity. It can be seen as little more, 
at this stage of our understanding, than an attempt at a 
conceptual formulation to be explored and assayed empirically.
Chapter IV 
Research Description and Procedures
The ultimate point of departure for any empirical study
of identity may be the caveats sounded by Ruesch and Lynd;
"Lhat goes into the sense, of identity is codified within the
organism in the analogic mode. It cannot be appraised
logically and has no quantitative or numerical value; it
cannot be tested ; it can only be experienced" (Ruesch, 1961,
p. 283; underline added).
Elaboration of research methods in psychology and 
social science has kept pace with the proliferation 
of labeling. Observations, categories, techniques 
for the study of human nature were never so abundant....
If understanding of identity and of ways of realizing 
it could be discovered by such means, this strategic 
problem of today would seem assured of solution.
But since every way of seeing is also a way of not 
seeing, it is possible that the very multiplication 
of categories and the very precision of techniques 
may sometimes act as barriers instead of as means of 
access to understanding. Reliance on accepted 
categories and methods may mean that certain phenomena 
essential for understanding identity escape attention 
(Lynd, 1961, p. 16),
Yet a concept as potentially integrative as identity needs to
be empirically explored in such a way that its usefulness in





Bronson (1957) studied Erikson's notions of identity 
diffusion from a structural point of view. Using judgments 
from personal interviews and measures based on semantic 
differential techniques, Bronson found significant inter­
correlations among his four measures, and that college students 
who are considered high on identity diffusion also exhibited 
some internal conflict or anxiety.
Howard (1960) and later Woldstad (1961) at Smith College 
studied identity conflicts in normal and disturbed adolescent 
girls by means of a questionnaire developed by Howard and 
refined by IJoldstad, The disturbed adolescents were found to 
reveal more anxiety over identity than the normal adolescents. 
The focus in these studies was upon the revelation of conscious 
concern over identity.
Miller (1965) reviewed a number of studies which are more 
characteristic of self-description than of identity studies. 
However, the work _ of Miller and his colleagues would seem to 
attest to the efficacy of self-ratings, projective tests, and 
recorded interviews as measuring techniques in identity studies, 
Witkin and his colleagues (Witkin e_c , 1962) offer what is 
perhaps the most definitive research to the present time on 
the structural aspects of identity. Anticipating that if the 
self is experienced as distinct and structurally differentiated, 
and self-defining internal frames of reference are available, 
the Witkin group expected a sense, of separate identity to be
iTic.nifested in three ways:
1. As "a linnilred need for guidance and support from 
o hhers” ;
2. As an ability to establish and maintain attitudes, 
judgments, and sentiments without external confirmation or 
reference; and
3. As a stable self-view regardless of context (p. 155) 
Individuals with an analytical approach--as contrasted with 
those evidencing a global approach--were found to show 
greater self-differentiation and hence a greater sense of 
separate, identity as measured by the above criteria.
Research Objectives 
The specific research objectives of the present study
were :
1. To explore the concept of identity as an empirical 
tool through a set of propositions derived from major identity 
theories. The approach followed was analogous to the construct 
validation procedure discussed by Selltiz, Jahoda, Deutsch,
and Cook (1959).
2. To compare and examine various existing test instruments 
for measuring and assessing subjective identity; and
3. To evaluate and partially to validate some assessment 
procedures designed specifically for this study.
As Hanson (1961) has indicated, the most notable research
Dmay begin with the data and not with hypotheses » Thus this 
study, both because of its exploratory nature and its valida­
tion objectives, does not proceed from specific experimental 
hypotheses. However, the general expectations "tested” by 
the empirical studies reported in this chapter were:
1. That subjective identity is a measurable psychological 
cons true t;
2. That a number of existing test instruments (specified 
in the following section) that might be expected to test one 
or more dimensions of identity are singly inadequate to assess 
subjective identity but cumulatively support the validity of 
the identity construct; and
3. That "high” and "low” identity individuals present 
discriminably different performance styles on assessment 
instruments such as story completions, sentence completions, 
and other methods evaluated in this study.
Procedure
Subjec ts and Setting. The choice of subjects and study
etting was based upon a Iwofuld rationale:
1. That a "normal” population would be most efficacious
in terms of the wider range of the latent characteristic to
be explored and validated; and
2. That a "normal" or field setting which would preclude
the subjects’ awareness of being observed and assessed would
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be a desirable condition for certain longitudinal, validity, 
and reliability requirements of the. study.
Tl'ius the choice of college students in a required, year­
long course, in the College of Business Administration at 
the University of Wichita seemed to assure a fairly random 
sample of students enrolled in that particular College, the 
advantage of repeated observation and testing, and the 
distinct advantage of conducting the study within the frame­
work of routine course requirements and activities. The 
course was an experimental course in the behavioral sciences 
for business students, and was being offered for the first 
time during the year of the study.
The students ranged in age from 19 to 42 ; most were in
the 20-24 age group. While most of the students were sophomores
and juniors, there were a few seniors and 4 first-year graduate 
students. Six of the initial 108 students in the class were 
women.
An especially advantageous aspect of these study condi­
tions was that the course was handled in such a manner as to 
prohibit the students’ avoidance of their responsibility for 
their own learning in the course. Thus certain additional 
observations of task-orientation and reaction to adversity 
could be made.
Test Instruments and Methods. A. A number of "hypotheses”
regarding the capacity of existing test instruments to tap
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identity comprised one major phase of the empirical assessment 
procedures. All test instruments and measures were adminis­
tered during the regular class meetings of the course, osten­
sibly as an aspect of the course’s guidance and development 
objectives. It was expected that, due to the multidimen­
sionality and heterogeneity of the concept of identity as 
theoretically formulated, no single measure would reliably 
discriminate differential identity, but that a battery of 
such measures might be found to discriminate "high" from 
"low" identity subjects, as validated by independent measures 
and determined by an ex post facto analysis (Greenwood, 1945). 
The most expedient way to describe these expectations may be 
to discuss them individually.
1. It would be expected, on the basis of theoretical 
formulations of identity, that positive identity individuals 
would evidence less maladjustment than negative or weak 
identity individuals. The measure selected for this aspect 
was the Grigg and Kelley "Scale for Self Description" (1960). 
Subjects were asked to complete three sentence stems each with 
three adjectives self-selected from a 12-adjective pool 
previously scaled for adjustment value by clinical and counsel­
ing psychologists. The scale purportedly taps adjustment in 
the areas of feelings, study habits, and social relations.
2. Particularly on the basis of Erikson’s formulations, 
ego-strength might be expected to be a factor in assessing 
differential identity. The measure utilized in this study
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was Barron's (1953) Ego-Strength Scale.
3. Bronson (1957), Uoldstad (1961), and Witkin ^  al.
(1962) have specifically suggested that anxiety is a salient 
factor in assessing identity. Taylor’s (1953) tîanifest Anxiety 
Scale was selected as a measure of anxiety for this study. An 
additional measure of anxiety-^Gleser, Gottschalk, and Springer 
(1961)--was to be derived from the taped interviews conducted 
near the end of the study, but, for a number of reasons, this 
measure was not utilized in the study.
4. Implicit in some of the theoretical formulations of 
identity, and explicit in the work of Witkin ^  _al. (1962), is 
the expectation that integrated identity individuals would 
indicate more preference for complexity in life than would 
diffuse identity individuals. An attempt was made to test this 
expectation with Barron’s Complexity-Simplicity Scale (1953).
An additional or substitute measure might be derived from the 
Welsh Figure Preference Test (1954), but the difficulties of 
administering and interpreting that test with such a large 
group made it unfeasible for this study.
5. A measure of satisfaction and affect was expected, 
on the basis of several of the theoretical formulations, to 
reflect a latent factor in "high" vs, "low" identity. A 
general Satisfaction Scale developed by Harris and described in 
Brim, Glass, Bavin, and Goodman (1962) was administered to test 
this expectation. The scale purports to measure satisfaction 
and degree of affect on the basis of responses to the same 40 
items,
6. As intia-.ated by Eribson, I,if ton, and others, an 
individual’s identity is closely linked to his basic beliefs.
To explore this possibility, a Test of Basic Beliefs (Brim
et £l,, 1962) was administered. Only the four scales relating 
to one’s beliefs regarding causation, of the total of 16 scales 
in the test, were utilized in this study. These were belief in 
animism, belief in fate, belief in the supernatural, and belief 
in multiple causation.
7. On the basis of several of the theoretical formulations 
discussed earlier, strength of identity might be expected to 
co-vary with degree of independence. This expectation was 
explored by Barron’s (1953) test of independence of judgment.
8. For a number of reasons implied or expressed in the 
various theoretical formulations, the researcher might expect 
to find a relationship between conditions of identity and self­
insight. This possibility was tested by a modification of 
Gross’s Self-Insight Scale (1947) in conjunction with some 
methodological leads furnished by Goodman (1953). Eighteen of 
Gross’s original items were used ( th minor alterations. The 
scale actually administered is reproduced in Appendix I.
Chapin’s Social Insight Scale might also have been used for 
this purpose, but the revised edition of that test was not 
available at the time this study was made.
9. The "Need for Certainty" test (Brim, 1954) was 
utilized in this study with the expectation that differential 
identity would co-vary with the degree of need-for~certainty
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as a basic orientation to life.
10. In order to evaluate the role of intelligence in 
subjective identity, the Otis Group Form Mental Maturity Test 
was administered. The expectation, inferred from the emphasis 
on competence and mastery in some of the theoretical formu­
lations, was that identity and intelligence scores would vary 
concomitantly.
11. The "Who-Are-You?" technique (Bugental and Zelen,
1950; Kuhn and McPartland, 1954) was employed. It was expected 
that the number and kind of consensual statements offered by
Ss might bear some relationship to identity measures and to 
other measures of adjustment and emotional stability utilized 
in this study.
12. Following Erikson's emphasis on time diffusion, and 
some implications of a study by Kastenbaum (1961), it was 
hypothesized that there would be a direct relationship be­
tween identity scores and the number of categories employed 
by individuals to describe their activities. To test this 
expectation, Ss were asked to list, by time segments, all
of their activities of the previous day. The number of 
categories they used for their lists was then correlated with 
their identity scores.
13.14 The MMPI was administered to provide a check against
l^This and the following measures were obtained during 
the second semester of the course.
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the '’normality” of the. group studied; the SI (Social IE 
Scale) and SC (Schizophrenia) scales, which might logically 
be expected to provide a means of validating the identity 
measures, were the two scales of particular interest in this 
study.
14. Three scales from the DF Opinion Survey were utilized: 
the AS (adventure vs. security) scale, the SR (self-reliance 
vs. dependence) scale, and the RT (realistic thinking) scale.
On the basis of previous research and the theoretical formu­
lations of identity reviewed previously, scores on these 
scales might be expected to co-vary with identity scale scores 
and with adjustment and other similar scores.
15. A semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 
1957) was administered in the following manner: the members
of each task group in the course (5-11 members) were asked first 
to rate other members on a 20-item, 7-point scale reproduced
as Appendix II. Then they were asked to rate "Myself as Others 
See We." Later they were asked to rate "Myself as I Usually 
Am." Finally, they were asked to rate "Myself as I Would Really 
Like to Be." The items comprising the scale were taken from 
Osgood and Luria (1954), Stagner and Osgood (1946), and from 
Gattell (1946); a few of the items (Mos. 15-20) were based upon 
expectations from theoretical formulations of identity. The 
concepts employed were those that would theoretically (Osgood 
and Luria, 1954) be expected to provide a basis for the three 
discrepancy scores sought by this measure:
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a. The discrepancy between others' ranking of self 
and self-judgments of others' rankings of self (O-SO);
b. The discrepancy between others' rankings of 
self and self-ranking (Myself as I Usually Am)— (0-S); 
and
c. The discrepancy between self-rankings of Myself 
as I Usually Am and self-rankings of Myself as I Would 
Really Like to Be (S-SI).
From an item analysis (inspection of plots) and on the basis 
of post-testing discussions with Ss, a number of the items 
were eliminated from the scoring of this measure. Only the 
items underscored (see Appendix II) were retained for scoring 
purposes. It was expected that the O-SO and the 0-S dis­
crepancy scores would vary directly with identity scores, and 
that the S-SI discrepancy scores would vary inversely with 
identity scores.
B. The second major 
phase of the empirical assessment procedures involved the 
development and partial validation of 5 identity scales. Three 
of the scales were constructed, pre-tested, and redesigned 
as operational scales based upon, the propositions derived 
from the theoretical formulations of identity surveyed in 
the previous chapters. This procedure follows that suggested 
by Gronbacfe and Meehl (1955) for construct validation.
The basic scale, the behavioral scale (B-Scale), was 
composed of twenty heterogeneous, multidimensional items
0 2
(Appendix III) derived from the theoretical propositions 
presented in Chapter 2. The five-point scale for each item 
(-2 to +2) was carefully explained in training sessions with 
two judges, who were graduate assistants in the course and 
who, at the time of tlie ratings,had had close contact with 
the Ss for a least 7 months, both 'n and out of class, and 
had evaluated at least 12 assignments prepared by each of the 
Ss. Judges’ ratings were made independently. Interjudge 
reliability (rho) for the 3-scale was .89.
The second identity measure was a self-report scale (SR.- 
scale, Appendix IV), As a part of his regular course require­
ments, each S wrote nine ''self-explorations,” for which he 
was encouraged to write a minimum of three pages during succes­
sive weeks of the first semester in the way of exploring his 
own behavior, ideas, beliefs, values, etc. On the basis of a 
preliminary content analysis, a six-item rating scale was 
developed from the set of theoretical propositions derived in 
Chapter 2, Two different judges (one graduate and one upper- 
division psychology student), after training, rated the self-
reports of a sample of 16 Ss selected as a representative
15cross-section of performance ' on the objective measures 
administered during the first semester. Interjudge reliability 
(rho) for the SR-scale was .74. The mean ratings of the two
^■^The specific procedure involved selecting the high positive 
variance, the high negative variance, and the zero variance Ss 
based upon the number of standard deviations each S ’s score varied 
from the population mean on each test (tests 1-10 supra), and 
sampling randomly from these three categories of o"s'.
judges were used in the furthec analysis of this measure.
The third rating scale of identity developed for this 
study was a If«item interview scale (I-scale, Appendix V), 
based upon the same sat of propositions, but differently 
organized and stated. Each of the three "identity” scales thus 
had both similar and unique items.
Two judges (the writer and an upper-division psychology 
student), after several orientation sessions, rated each of 
the. same 15 Ss rated on the SR-scala from the"1.1. U  f  L 1 c: V i - O  d
(The interview schedule, is presented as Appendix VI.) Inter­
judge reliability (rho) for this measure was .79. Mean ratings 
were used in further analysis.
A fourth measure of identity utilized in this study was 
the "tash-reaction" scale, created by Witkin e_t _al. (1952) for 
assessing task attitudes and similar stylistic variations in 
the performance of story-telling in the laboratory. This 
measure is a 4-item, 5-point scale (referred to later as the
W-scale); it is presented as Appendix VII in the form utilized
in this study. Independent ratings by two judges (the writer 
and a graduate assistant) of the same sample of 16 Ss plus an
additional 13 Ss selected on the basis of their high, middle,
or low rankings on the B-scale produced an interjudge reliability 
(rho) of .86. The judges utilized both their longitudinal 
observations of course tasks, and Ss’s written responses to one 
specific question from the first-semester performance summary: 
"Discuss, as frankly as you wish, your reactions to this course,"
It was expected that such task-orientations, revealed 
behaviorally and in writing, would be analogous to those 
observed by IJitkin and his colleagues.
The fifth measure of differential identity was also 
taken from Witkin et al, (1962). All Ss completed Draw-a-Ferson 
tests, both male and female figures (’lachover, 1948). Tae 
drawings were rated independently according to the Marlens 
scheme (Witkin » 1962, p. 118 ff.) by two judges (the
writer and a graduate psychology student). This procedure 
purports to measure sophistication-of-body-concept, which in 
turn is taken to reflect identity integration vs, diffusion. 
Interjudge reliability (rho) for this scale (referred to later 
as the Body-'Concept or rl-Scale) was .92. Mean scores were used 
in further analysis,
C. The third major 
phase of the empirical assessment and validation procedures 
was concerned with the attempt to qualify and partially to 
validate four additional measures devised for this study, and 
expected, on the basis of the theoretical formulations and 
derived propositions, to provide somewhat more efficient and 
projective means of assessing identity. Since clinical and 
research protocols do not usually permit longitudinal obser­
vation of behavior, or the possibility of repeated self-reports 
in writing, or reliable observations of task orientations and 
reactions to adversity, the following methods were assayed by 
multiple analysis of the performances of 29 Ss who were
68
classified as high, neutral, or low identity Ss on the basis 
of their scores on the five scales described in the preceding 
sec fcion:
1. A sentence completion test. On the basis of the 
raethological guides provided by Rotter and Willerraan (1947) 
and Rohde (1937), 12 sentence stems were devised which were 
expected to tap one or more of the dimensions of identity 
characterized by the theoretical formulations of identity 
surveyed in Chapter 2 and the propositions derived from them. 
The sentence completion test finally administered to all Ss 
is reproduced as Appendix I’ll!. It was expected that differ­
ential scorers on the 5 identity scales would complete the 
stems in discriminably different ways both in terms of content 
and style.
2, Story completions. In the spirit of the early Wolff 
studies (1943, Ch. 15), and the very recent Arnold research 
(Arnold, 1962), 8 story "stems” (Appendix IX) were developed 
to tap one or more of the identity dimensions characterized 
by the derived propositions. All Ss continued or completed 
these stories according to the instructions for each. While 
Arnold has warned of the difficulty in interpreting from con­
versation produced by Ss using the TAT, it was expected that 
stylistic variations in all-written material would thereby be 
minimized; thus both conversation and narrative completions 
were called for in this set of story completions. In general, 
it was e:<pected that high and low identity scorers (on the 5 
identity scales) would produce discriminably different styles
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and contents in their story treatments. To the extent that 
they might do so, the story completion technique might serve 
as a clinical substitute for the less efficient behavioral 
and self-report scales.
3. Projected biography (or autobiography). A procedure 
expected to be particularly fruitful as an assessment instrument 
was the projected biography (or autobiography). All 3s wrote
a biography (or autobiography) of themselves from the point of 
view of some time after their deaths, in a narrative form, and 
covering the significant events of their lives from the day 
of the assignment to the end of their lives. Written in class, 
these narratives varied in length from three to seven handwritten 
pages. It was expected that certain differential elements of 
content and style might be identified in the performances of 
Ss who fell at each end of the continuum on the 5 identity scales 
described previously.
4. The fourth major methodology explored was the possibility 
of identifying ’’high’* vs, "low” identity individuals on the 
basis of their rhetorical or expositional styles. Each of the
Ss produced from 6,000-10,000 words in a wide range of forms 
having an equally broad range of objectives; this material 
provided a rich source for an analysis of this sort. For this 
part of the study, the leads of Baldwin (1942), Sanford (1942), 
and Hale (1920) were especially useful. These analyses were 
conducted both independently and cooperatively by the writer, 
an upper-division English student, an upper-division psychology
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student, and the two graduate assistants for the course, 
number of background and procedural discussions were held 
prior to the initiation of the analyses. None of the analysts, 
at the time these analyses were made, was aware of the 
classification of the Ss on the basis of the 5 identity scales.
The postulated relationship between speech and personality 
has a long and venerable history in psychology, a history given 
particular impetus by Dewey (1922) and Sapir (1927), without 
producing an integrated body of empirical data consistent with 
the supposed basic level of the phenomenon being investigated. 
While no attempt was made in this study to suggest such an 
integration of existing data, it was expected that, given the 
integrative level of the theoretical concept of identity, this 
type of analysis might be especially fruitful.
As with the three preceding methods of studying or asses­
sing identity explored and evaluated in this study, no specific 
hypotheses were set forth. It was reasoned that any factors 
which discriminated ’’high” from ’’low” identity individuals 
would be legitimate discriminanda. However, a wide range of 
possible factors was derived from the empirical literature
E.g., type-tohen ratios, action quotients, semantic 
orientations and styles, verb-adjective ratios, impoi-ts, 
quantity of material produced, objectivity (absence, of an ”1”), 
economy and effectiveness of expression, vagueness and 
obnubilation, stereotypy and rigidity of expression, grammati­
cal structures, evaluative, assertion analysis, Discomfort-R.elief 
Word Quotient, lack of diversity, over-reliance on character­
istic modes of expression, and so forth.
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for educlnp, both coiriaou and uncomv'.on factors through repeated
analyses of the writing performances of the 3s.
Chapter 5 
Research Results and Discussion
Because the objectives of the research conducted for 
this study were basically eductive or exploratory and not 
definitive in nature, the results cannot be summarily 
presented. However, the objectives of the research phase 
of this study were achieved, and basic expectations fulfilled. 
The heuristic value of the results of a study such as this 
may more than compensate for the lack of precision required 
at this stage of our theoretical development of the concept 
of identity (Lynd, 1961).
The Measurability of The 
Construct "Identity"
The multiple discrimination of the same ordering of the 
population tested by various forms of assessment instruments 
for measuring identity may be taken as suggesting both their 
reliability and the validity of the construct (Selltiz,
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Jahoda, Deutsch, and Cook, 1960, p. 158 Table I
presents the obtained product-tncment correlations between the 
anchoring behavioral scale and the other four identity scales 
employed in this study. These results would seem clearly to 
suggest that identity is a measurable characteristic of
Table 1 
Product-Moment Correlations 
of the Behavioral with 
the other Identity Scales
Scale r d.f. Probability
Behavioral Scale (B-scale)
Self-Report Scale (SR-scale) .89 15 < .01
Interview Scale (I-scale) .76 15 < .01
Task-Reaction Scale (W-scale) .89 28 < .01
Body-Concept Scale (M-scale) .68 28 < .01
individuals, that identity is a valid empirical construct, 
and that identity may reliably be assessed by these scales.
The somewhat lower relationship between the B- and M-Scales 
is most likely attributable to the fact that the M-Scale was
^^Thc original study design anticipated the possibility 
of factoring a 26x26 intercorrelation matrix based on scores 
derived from a number of existing tests that might be ex­
pected to assess one or more of the theoretical propositions. 
But the consistently high interjudge reliabilities for each 
of the 5 identity scales (see Table 1) with the anchoring 
behavioral scale, obviated this procedure. Some of the 
relevant results of the intercorrelations are referred to later 
in this chapter, however, for the further research interest 
they may offer.
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the only undimensional scale employed in this phase of the 
8 tudy.
The Efficacy of the 
Indirect Measures
The several test instruments which were evaluated in 
this study on the expectation that they might tap one or more 
of the dimensions of identity were found to be singly 
inadequate to assess subjective identity. In Table 2 are 
presented the product-moment correlations of scores on all 
other measures with scores on the B-scale.
Table 2 
Product-Moment Correlations 
between the B-scale and other Tests 
Administered






Adjustment (Grigg and .18 15 > .05
Kelley, 1960)
Ego-Strength .23 15 > .05
(Barron. 1953)
Anxiety (Taylor, 1953) -.29
(Table continued on 
next page)
15 > .05
^^It was assumed that the highly significant correlations 
of the other identity scales with the B-scale obviated the 
necessity of obtaining intercorrelations, and that the B-scale 
was the most reliable for the present purpose.
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Table 2— Continued




Preference for Complexity -.03 15 > .05
(Barron, 1953)
Satisfaction -.06 15 > .05
(Brim et al., 1962)
Affect .05 15 > .05
(Brim ^  al., 1962)
Basic Beliefs
(Brim et al., 1962)
Animism -.03 15 > .05
Supernatural -.16 15 > .05
Fate -.39 15 > .05
Multiple Causation .34 15 > .05
Self-Insight (Gross, .38 15 > .05
1947)
Need-for-Certainty -.31 15 > .05
(Brim et al., 1962)
Otis MentâT Maturity .44 15 > .05





Social Index Scale -.42 15 > .05
Schizophrenia Scale -.02 15 > .05
DF Opinion Survey
Adventure vs. Security .41 15 > .05
Self-Reliance .11 15 > .05
Realistic Thinking .04 15 > .05
Semantic Differential
O-SO Discrepancy .07 15 > .05
0-S Discrepancy .07 15 > .05
S-SI Discrepancy .34 15 > .05
Time Categories .75 13 < .01
It can readily be seen from an inspection of Table 2 
that only one of the indirect assessment techniques appears 
to have reliably ordered the intensive research sub-population 
in the same way as did the 5 identity scales; that was the 
Time Categories Technique. The significance of that apparent
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relationship may be interpreted in the following manner: 
individuals scoring higher on one or more of the identity 
scales described in this study tend also to utilize more 
categories in describing their activities, and conversely.
While none of the other correlations is significant at 
the .05 level, the cumulative effect of a number of relation­
ships in the expected direction provides an additional incre­
ment of validity for the construct of identity and the derived 
theoretical propositions (Selltiz et al., 1960, p. 160 ff.). 
Mutual validation is apparent particularly in the following 
measures: ego-strength, freedom from anxiety, absence of 
belief in fate, belief in multiple causation, independence of 
judgment, self-insight, absence of a need-for-certainty, 
intelligence (Otis), social participation, adventurousness, 
and self-ideal discrepancy. Most of these directional 
relationships would be expected on the basis of their relevance 
to one or more theories of identity. The measures which were 
particularly non-discriminating in this context— adjustment, 
preference for complexity, degree of satisfaction and degree 
of affect, belief in animism and the supernatural, the number 
of consensual responses on the W-A-Y test, the Sc scale of the 
M M P I , the self-reliance and realistic thinking scales of the 
DF Opinion Survey, and the O-SO and 0-S discrepancy scores, 
are generally less relevant to most of the theories of identity 
considered in this study.
With the exception of the three semantic differential 
discrepancy scores and the Time Categories measure, none of
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these tests was designed specifically with the construct of 
identity as a conceptual framework. Thus, while their 
usefulness as indirect techniques in the assessment of 
subjective identity may be questionable on the basis of this 
study, the consistency of scores in the expected direction, 
given additional verification of these tendencies in other 
studies of identity, might be taken as tentative evidence for 
discriminating "high" from "low" identity individuals. It is 
possible, in other words, that an individual’s profile of 
scores on the more clearly related group of tests (ego-strength, 
etc.), would be indicative of his ordering on one or more of 
the identity scales used in this study. Analysis of the pro­
files completed for all Ss would seem to support this conjecture. 
"High-identity" scorers (B-scale) presented significantly more 
variance from mean scores (2i times as much) on this set of 
tests than did "low-identity" scorers.
However, it should be noted that one informal expectation—  
that the magnitude of variation on all test instruments 
(exclusive of the identity scales) would discriminate among 
Ss consistent with their ordering on the identity scales—  
was unsupported. The product-moment correlation between the 
scores of the groups thus distinguished was -.06. Elimination 
of the 12 less discriminating measures had the effect of 
increasing this index of relationship to an r of -.21. Inspec­
tion of individual scores revealed that some low scorers on 
the 5 identity scales evidenced little or no variability from
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the average scores on the indirect tests. One would expect, 
on the basis of previous studies, that such inconsistencies 
from a theoretical point of view might be attributable either 
to anxiety connected with self-revelation (McClelland et al., 
1953) or some witting or unwitting attempt to give socially 
desirable scores (Edwards, 1957).
The apparent lack of correspondence between the adjustment 
and identity scores is both défendable and perplexing. As 
Maslow has indicated (1954), self-actualizers frequently 
show relatively high "alienation" scores. Hence, if this 
adjustment instrument measures social "adjustment," as it 
clearly appears to, then the absence of a relationship with 
identity scores is understandable. However, the adjustment 
scores for all Ss correlated significantly with such other 
measures as ego-strength and adventurousness, which, in turn, 
were more clearly related in direction and magnitude to the 
identity measures. Given the fact that this adjustment measure 
also correlated significantly with other measures which seemed 
to bear no discriminable relationship to the identity scales, 
one might conclude that common elements of the adjustment 
measure and other measures with which it did correlate were 
not fundamental elements in the identity scales.
Another noteworthy failure of expectation was the 
apparent non-discriminability of the Preference for 
Complexity Scale. While the scores on this measure did 
intercorrelate significantly with the Independence and 
Need-for-Certainty scores, there was no apparent relationship
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between these scores and the scores of other measures 
which were more clearly related to the identity scores.
Thus one might conclude that complexity-simplicity are 
relative to the individual’s own frame of reference, and 
that the continuum of possibilities for performance on 
this test is more restricted than that provided by the 
multidimensional identity scale employed.
The failure of the scores based upon the number 
of nonconsensual responses in the W-A-Y technique to 
vary more directly with other measures of adjustment and 
integration (e.g.. Independence) is interesting. The 
notion, as proposed by Bugental and Zelen (1950) and 
some later researchers, is that the fewer the consensual 
responses the more likelihood of some psychological 
disturbance. While the intercorrelation of the W-A-Y 
scores with the MAS scores was significant at the .05 
level (-.25, N=108), most of the other intercorrelations 
approached zero. Since the strength and dominant mode 
or source of identity may certainly be expected to vary 
independently, a reasonable conclusion would seem to 
be that the present use of the W-A-Y technique is not 
a reliable one for assessing subjective identity.
Although there are many other intriguing possibilities 
for discussion with such a heterogeneous mass of data, 
a single additional observation seems most pertinent.
It was expected, on the basis of the conceptual
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orientation provided by the several theories of identity, 
that "high" identity individuals would better predict 
others' evaluations of them (the first semantic differential 
discrepancy score), and also that their own characterizations 
of themselves would be more consistent with others' 
characterizations of them. This expectation was clearly 
not borne out. While no empirical data to interpret this 
reversal was specifically sought in the study, it might be 
tentatively concluded that an unmeasured interaction between 
the imposed conditions of the course, and the implications 
of this assessment task performed by the Ss, might account 
for the absence of any apparent relationship between these 
scores. Different subjects under different testing 
conditions might well produce results in the expected direc­
tion. Also, it is possible that the source of the reversal 
lies in the inability of "low" and "intermediate" 
identity Ss to perceive "high" identity Ss accurately.
The complexity of person perception research is well 
attested to by the several essays in Tagiuri and Petrullo 
(1958). The covariance between identity scores (B-Scale) 
and the self— self/ideal discrepancy scores is perhaps 
attributable to the non-defensive insight of "high- 
identity" scorers and their willingness to work toward 
greater achievements.
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Validation of Other Indirect 
Methods of Assessment
Sentence Completion Test. As indicated previously, 12 
sentence stems (Appendix VIII) were constructed to tap one 
or more of the factors underlying the theoretical proposi­
tions derived in Chapter 2. All Ss completed the sentences 
during the first semester of the course. On the basis of 
their scores on the B-scale, two sub-groups were identified: 
those whose scores were more than one standard deviation 
above the mean, and those whose scores were more than one 
standard deviation below the mean. Then a random sample 
(exclusive of the 16-subject intensive study sub-population 
utilized on the interview and other scales) of 4 Ss was drawn 
from each of these sub-groups for intensive analysis of their 
sentence completions. This analysis failed to reveal any 
consistent differences between sub-groups in their completions 
of stems 5, 7, 8, 10, and 12; consequently those stems were 
dropped from the test. The homogeneity of the completions 
of the remaining seven stems by the respective sub-groups 




Sentence Completion Rating Scale





























tasks or immediate 
problems, etc.
Refers to giving up, 
external causes, 
blaming, or excusing, 
feelings of useless­
ness
Refers to not doing 
well at undesirable 
activities or immed­
iate problems, 
retaliation or bad 













Refers to long-range 
self-chosen goals, 
future consequences, 
life decisions, or 
a playing down of 
their importance:







Refers to failure to 
live up to potential, 
lack of positive 
accomplishment toward 
goals
(Table continued on next page)
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Table 3— Continued




I usually feel Refers to being
that
I would like 
life better
better than others, 
of having the big­
gest problems, of 
not having enough 
time to achieve, 
of certainty of 
success
Refers to inabil­
ity to understand 
life objectively, 
the need for some­
thing to make life 
worthwhile, the need 





ent life and 
activities, of not 
doing something 
as well as possi­
ble, of being an 
average person
Refers to the 
desirability of 
sharing life with 
others, of achiev­
ing goals or 
higher levels of 
understanding, etc,
The sentence completions of the 16 intensive-analysis 
Ss were then subjected to this scale. Two judges, neither 
psychological sophisticates, rated the S s ’s completions of 
these seven stems. Interjudge reliability (rho) was .83.
The mean ratings of the two judges on each item were then 
correlated with the scores of the same 16 Ss on the B-Scale 
(product-moment correlation). The resultant r was .59 
(P <.05), which may be taken as a partial validation of this 
crude scale as an indirect method of assessing subjective 
identity. However, the sample analyzed was quite small and 
the point range quite limited. Further validation is re­
quired before this scale could reliably be used alone as an 
assessment procedure.
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"Projected Biography." The same analysis sample was 
utilized as previously. Readily discriminable differentia 
in content and style (and import) were sought in the intensive 
analysis of the written biographies (or autobiographies) 
described earlier.
The most reliable differentia were found to be the fol­
lowing:
A. "Low" identity scorers:
1. Produced more unrealistic records of achievement 
(both in terms of timing and in terms of level of 
achievement)
2. Exhibited more anxiety about visibility of 
achievements
5. Talked about living rather than getting involved 
with it
4. Extended present problems rather than reporting 
encounters with new or changing problems and thus reflect­
ing personal growth
5. Reported achievements which seemed to oome as 
matters of fate or sly dealings rather than from well- 
intentioned commitment to work
6. Tended to write in the third person and in an 
"objective" style
7. Did not refer to well-defined events but exhibited 
a vague diffuseness about chains of occurrences
8. Tended to "live" more in first and second 
generations,of offspring rather than own life
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9. Reflected extreme "egocentrism," through super­
latives of description ("greatest," "best-liked," "most 
successful," etc.)
10. Saw love and family as reward for achievement 
rather than as worthwhile in its own right
11. Exhibited inability to maintain consistent point 
of view (illogical variations of past and present tenses, 
use of "I" when writing a biography, etc.)
12. Reflected a hurry to terminate life, with fewer 
events recounted.
B. "High" Identity scorers:
l.-lG. Generally reflected the obvious opposites 
of these factors.
A  "blind" sample of 10 biographies were rated by the above 
criteria, scoring +1 for each positive criterion, -1 for each 
negative criterion. The derived scores were correlated with 
the B-scale scores (product-moment r) for these 10 Ss. The 
obtained r was .63 (P <.05).
As was true of the sentence completion test scale, how­
ever, the sample was quite small and the range of scores 
constricted; thus, this scoring procedure could not be pre­
sumed to be a singly reliable identity assessment technique 
without further validation.
Story Completions. The story completions of the same two 
sub-populations were analyzed in a search for reliable discrim­
inanda. Of the factors revealed by this analysis, the following
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seemed to be the most differentiating:
A. "Low" identity scorers:
1. Tend to talk about, discuss, and evaluate problems 
rather than get actively engaged in telling story to some 
end
2. Endow characters with passivity (being "acted- 
upon" by situations rather than transacting), and a 
seeming inability to take positive action, to be self- 
determing, or self-accountable
3. Create "marketing-oriented" and mistrustful 
interpersonal relations; emphasize structure rather than 
functions of human relationships
4. Characterize persons as unable to accept the 
reality of difficult situations, as escaping or denying 
reality; problems are solved "magically" by simply saying 
so (i.e., without understanding or effort on the part of 
the characters involved)
5. Evidence considerable direct and indirect concern 
with the moral or legal (or other standardized, sociolog­
ical) consequences of behavior; tend to write in terms
of "shoulds" and "oughts"
6. Attempt to be "objective"; little evidence of 
an "I"
7. Exhibit lack of empathy, absence of sincere 
attempts to understand or to accept others, and non­
involvement and indifference as story-tellers and in their 
characters
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8. Reflect an inclination to save or "straighten" 
others out; exhibit condescension, superiority, and/or 
obsequiousness
9. Tend to intellectualize, to rely on words of 
feeling rather than of behavior
10. Use more subjunctive and conditional ex­
pressions, stereotypy (in language and plot), and more 
generalized statements (rather than specific details 
or personalized dialogue)
11. Are less likely to complete stories, solve 
the problem (through concrete action of one or more of 
the characters), or conclude the behavioral sequence 
initiated by the stem
B. "High" identity scorers;
l.-ll. Tend generally to exhibit the polar 
opposites of the above factors.
A random sample of 10 sets of story completions was 
evaluated using these criteria, scoring -1 for the presence 
of each negative factor, +1 for the presence of each positive 
factor. These scores were then correlated with the B-Scale 
scores (product-moment correlation) of the same Ss. The 
obtained r was .32, which is not a significant index at the 
.10 level of significance, although it is in the expected 
direction.
Two of the obvious confounding factors in this attempt 
to isolate reliable discriminanda in these story completions are 
the flexibility that derives from experience or interest, and
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the extent and kind of exposure to the mass media. Since it 
was not possible to hold these factors constant, they may be 
assumed to be interacting with the factors of concern. In 
spite of this, one might expect, with a larger sample, to 
obtain an r of the same magnitude. Thus no item analysis was 
made.
Linguistic Style. Repeated analyses failed to isolate 
reliable discriminating stylistic factors--other than those 
incorporated in the previous two scales. "Low” identity 
scorers evidenced more grammatical and spelling errors, but 
these could as readily be attributed to factors measured by 
the Otis test as to identity factors. "High" identity scorers 
evidenced less constraint; their styles were more idiosyncratic 
and vigorous. Their word choice was wider, and their construc­
tions more variant. "High" identity scorers also produced more 
material than "low" identity scorers, thus reflecting more 
interest and involvement. "Low" identity scorers were less 
specific and offered less detail or substantiation; they thus 
seemed to be more willing to stand on their opinions rather 
than to proceed logically or to document their assertions.
"Low" identity scorers also presented more stilted, "academic" 
styles and constrictions, although this characteristic was 
not limited to the "low" scoring group.
None of these factors was believed to be reliable as 
differentia, however. Thus no specific method of measuring 
writing style was developed from this study.
Chapter 6 
Summary and Conclusions
The current and growing interest in identity as an 
integrating concept in psychology was the impetus for this 
conceptual, empirical, and methodological study. An 
analysis of a number of theoretical formulations of identity 
was the basis for the derivation of a set of propositions 
to be tested, and for a formulation of subjective identity 
as a framework for the empirical investigations undertaken 
to validate the construct of identity. Three identity scales 
were developed from this theoretical formulation and set of 
propositions; two additional identity scales from Witkin 
et al.(1962) were also employed. These five scales reliably 
ordered the subjects in a homologous way, and hence were 
relied upon to provide a means of evaluating the discriminatory 
power of a number of existing tests for measuring subjective 
identity. Although none was found, as expected, to discrimi­
nate "high" from "low" identity individuals (as identified 
by the 5 identity scales), the consistency of the direction 
of their relationships with the identity scales served to
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validate the construct identity as an assessable and 
usable empirical concept. Additionally, "low" identity 
individuals were found to vary considerably less from 
the mean scores on a number of existing tests, thus 
suggesting a method of identifying the "highs" from the 
"lows" on profiles drawn from scores on the following 
measures: ego-strength, manifest anxiety, belief in fate 
and belief in multiple causation, independence of judg­
ment, self-insight, need-for-certainty, intelligence, social 
participation, and adventurousness. "High" identity 
scorers were also found to indicate more discrepancy be­
tween self and self-ideal on the semantic differential 
instrument, but the difference was not believed to be a 
reliable one.
One indirect measure found to discriminate reliably 
between "high" and "low" identity scorers was a technique 
employed for evaluation in this study: a "time categories" 
measure. On the theoretical possibility that "low" or 
diffuse identity individuals might generally utilize 
fewer categories to describe their daily experiences, 
subjects were requested to complete a record of their 
activities "yesterday," using clock times to identify 
each activity. "High" scorers on the identity scales were 
found to use significantly more categories in so describing 
the record of a day’s activities.
A third major objective of this study--in addition
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to the conceptual analysis and the empirical investigations—  
was to educe reliable discriminanda from the protocols of 
subjects on a sentence completion test, a "projected 
biography," and a series of story completions, with the 
object of partially validating the scales based upon these 
discriminanda against the identity scales developed 
previously. Both the sentence and the story stems were 
based upon the set of propositions derived from theoretical 
formulations of identity. The projected biography represents 
a more indirect method of assessment.
The scale developed from the sentence completion 
test (after an item analysis which revealed the inefficacy 
of 5 of the 12 stems) was found to discriminate at a 
reliable level the "high" from the "low" identity scorers 
in a random sample of protocols produced by the subjects.
Similarly, a scale developed from the story completion 
protocols was found to discriminate the "high" from the 
"low" identity scorers, but at a less reliable level.
The scale developed for scoring the projected biographies 
was likewise employed on a blind random sample of these 
protocols, and was found to identify "high" from "low" 
identity scorers on the B-Scale (the anchoring identity 
scale).
None of these three scales, however, was considered 
to be sufficiently reliable for independent use without
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further validation. The objective was to explore the 
possibility of devising more efficient indirect measures 
of subjective identity; these three possibilities 
satisfy that objective.
An attempt to develop a scoring procedure based upon 
discriminanda educed from stylistic variation evident in 
a wide range of other written material produced by the 
subjects during the course was unsuccessful. A number 
of differences were found, but these were not clearly 
scalable nor were they expected to be reliable.
The basic objective of this exploratory study was 
thus satisfactorily achieved.
Some Methodological Considerations. The inefficacy of 
a number of direct assessment procedures reliably to 
discriminate the "high" from the "low" scorers on an 
anchoring identity scale (the B-Scale), constructed on 
the basis of a set of propositions derived from theoretical 
formulations of identity, may be taken as further evidence 
of the multidimensionality and heterogeneity of the identity 
construct. An analysis of individual scores on the first 
15 tests administered (Table 2) revealed a consistently 
higher variation from mean scores by "high" identity 
scorers. Such a finding might be interpreted in two 
ways: that these tests, developed from and standardized 
on "normal" populations, may not adequately tap that
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level of the tested-for continuum at which "high" identity 
scorers might be discriminated; or that "low" identity 
scorers may typically present more defenses in performances 
on tests of this sort, or be more susceptible to socially- 
desirable responses (Edwards, 1957). n either case, these 
particular paper-and-pencil tests may be expected to be 
unreliable methods of assessing subjective identity, at 
least as that construct has been operationalized in this 
study. The possibilities of a method of profile analysis 
(Ch. 5) remain open, however.
The three indirect methods of assessing subjective 
identity developed and partially validated in this study 
offer some promise of becoming reliable assessment or 
research instruments after further refinement and validation. 
The projected biography technique, because it potentially 
taps most if not all of the identifiable dimensions of 
subjective identity, is particularly promising as a method 
of assessment. Experimentation with different instructions, 
and perhaps with restrictions on length or other form 
aspects, would be useful in refining this procedure.
The utilization of a "normal" popularion for research 
on identity, and for validation and standardization of 
assessment procedures, would seem to be particularly 
efficacious. Comparative studies of clinical, "alienated," 
and "self-actualizing" samples would contribute increments 
of validity and a more articulate means of refining the
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various procedures and methodologies. Two conditions 
of the research setting particularly recommend themselves: 
that the subjects be observed under frustrating or personally 
challenging task conditions in order to assess their approach 
and reactions to adversity; and that the function of the 
research setting be such that some internal change in 
subjects be expected to occur ^  they are individually 
capable of accepting or encouraging such changes (Weigert, 
1960).
Some Implications for Further Research. Other than 
those expressed or implied in the preceding pages, a few 
implications for further research warrant specification.
First, the factor of achievement appears consistently 
in the theoretical formulations of identity, and is either 
explicit or implicit in the 5 identity scales utilized 
in this study. An evaluation of n achievement, as identified 
either by McClelland et al. (1953) or by Arnold (1962), 
as that measure relates to identity as conceived and assessed 
in this study, would provide additional foundation for 
further studies of identity.
The Witkin ^  (1962) approach would seem to be
particularly fruitful by extension into story interpretation 
and story completion, in an attempt to isolate differentia 
of field-analytic vs. global approach individuals. The 
apparent relationship between the Witkin researchers*
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instruments and the identity scales developed for this 
study provides a broader base from which to explore further 
both the identity construct and methods of assessing it.
An apparent "quality” of "high" identity scorers that 
emerges from a re-analysis of the items used for scoring 
seems to be what might be called "multipotentiality"; that 
is, "high" identity scorers seem to function from more 
complex and yet more highly integrated cognitive-evaluative 
structures, and to exhibit less constriction, inhibition, 
and stereotypy in their performances and responses. An 
attempt to operationalize Kelly’s notion of "man’s construction 
of his alternatives" (Kelly, 1958) might well produce 
an intrapersonal assessment technique which would order 
individuals in a manner similar to their ordering on one 
or more of the identity scales utilized in this study.
An incidental observation from this study was that "high" 
identity scorers exhibited a generally higher level of 
activity, awareness, and psychological vitality (Barron,
1963). It would seem to be both possible and desirable 
to create reliable measures of "vitality" which might in 
turn discriminate levels of one or more dimensions of 
subjective identity in various populations.
The interviews conducted for this study also revealed 
some support for Brown’s contention (1956) that "low-identity" 
students are also "low" in social and peer-group orientation.
If such orientation were conceived as active involvement
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and commitment, then it would seem to be possible to assay 
certain dimensions of identity by some procedure which would 
reliably discriminate levels of social and peer-group 
orientation.
Although the contribution of "independence” to the 
over-all measurement of identity in this study was not 
clear-cut, the possibilities for reliably ordering 
individuals on subjective identity by some measure of 
indpendence remain relatively unqualified. Utilizing a 
scoring method similar to Arnold’s (1962) for assessing 
"independence" in story protocols might be a particularly 
effective way of identifying independents (vs. dependents) 
and of comparing the ordering of scores by this technique 
with the ordering of scores on one or more of the identity 
scales employed in this study.
The possibility of "testing" identity through actual 
or laboratory experiences analogous to marginality might also 
be an especially efficacious way of assessing identity 
strength or integration. The difficulty of controlling 
actual circumstances of marginality suggests the use of 
a modified role-playing technique similar to that described 
by Stanton and Litwak (1955). The researcher or his 
assistant, by invariably disconfirming the subject, or by 
consistently thwarting the subject’s role claims or expec­
tations , creates a relatively unstructured interpersonal 
situation in which the subject can neither "be" what it
97
appears he should be nor what he might attempt to "be” 
as an alternative role. His reactions to such situations 
might be scored in such a way that this procedure could be 
validated against the scores of the same subjects on one or 
more of the identity scales of this study.
Other possibilities for further research may emerge as 
the results of this exploratory study are replicated or 
re-examined.
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I. I have criticized others for saying things that I might 
very well have said myself- T F
2- I am sure of only those things of which I have proof.
T F
3. I have no need to deceive myself on anything concern­
ing my personality. T F
4. Much of my reasoning consists in finding arguments for 
going on thinking as I already do. T F
5. I have always appreciated a frank criticism of my 
faults. T F
6. I can as easily laugh at myself as at other people.
T F
7. I never try to make anyone believe that I am a different 
person from what I know myself to be.
T F
8. I have at times acted upon the basis of self interest 
knowing that my gains would be another's losses.
T F
9. I am always careful to correctly describe what I have 
read or seen. T F
10. There is no one who might think of me as a selfish 
person. T F
II. I have no feeling of hostility toward anyone.
T F
12. There are times when I have been a source of annoyance 
to other people. T F
13. As a friend, some people would find me disappointing.
T F
14. If it were not for the fear of disapproval, I would 
probably violate certain social conventions.
T F
_______________ (Continued on next page)________________________




15. I have never insulted anyone. T F
16. I sometimes criticize another's actions because of 
the feeling of self-righteousness and superiority it 
gives m e . T F
17. I sometimes do a good turn because of the praise or 

















































In his behavior and performances, 
and in his talk about himself, this 
person exhibits;
+2 +1
1. Purposiveness ; a sense 
of usefulness
2. Autonomy (internal values 
and drives ; not needing 
others to "get going," to 
make decisions, etc.); self- 
governing; self-determining




5. True engagement or encounter 
with others; openness to 
full relatedness (mutual or 
complementary) with others; 
a relating to self and 
others as unique persons
6. Spontaneity; high degree of 
insight into the limiting 
effects of habitual 
responses ; transcendence 
of and creativity in role- 
playing
-1 -2





achieving orientations ; 
non-productive
Fear or anxiety about 
possible failure; self- 
deprecation; self- 
consciousness that inter­
feres with commitment to 
work and others ; lack of 
self-confidence and self- 
assurance
Inability to engage others 
authentically; clinging 
to stereotyped or formal 
relationships, to paper 
identity; treatment of 
self and others as things; 
inability to transcend 
others' approval
Determination primarily 
by automatisms and 
social sanctions or role 
imperatives; low insight 
into social influence on 
own behavior; rigid ad­
herence to stereotypy in 
role-playing
(Continued on next page)
113
Appendix III (continued) 
Behavioral Scale (continued)
+ 2 + 1 0 -1 -2
8 .
9.
Acceptance of ultimate sub­
jectivity and the fact that 
one’s life is one’s own 
responsibility; openness to 
own experiences and values; 
direct reference to own ex­
periences as basic aspect 
of reality
Ability to deal with the 
world in terms of own wants 
and needs and desires 
(without moral or other 
sanction) and not in terms 
of what he thinks he should 
want and desire
A real sense of pleasure in 
living the life he is liv- 
ing--of general well-being
10. A personal style or idiom; 
some kind of personal creed 
or philosophy arrived at 
through effort
11. Ability to cope with life 
metaphorically; high toler­




ity" and presumptions of 
getting at the "real" 
world directly; dispersion 
of responsibility for own 
life and values; consider­
able self-amnesia in some 
aspects of own life; in­
ability to accept own ex­
periences as aspect of 
reality
Need to have a moral or 
other sanction for own 
wants and desires (and be­
liefs); thinking in terms 
of what he should want and 
should do and should be- 
lieve or value
No clear or real sense of 
pleasure in living; com­
plaining, fault-finding, 
"disadvantaged" orienta­
tions; sense of wrongness 
(or being wronged), of in­
completeness, or of mis­
giving, however vague; liv­
ing by phantasies rather 
than by well-intentioned 
work
No personal style or idiom; 
exaggerated stereotype of 
style of behavior and values; 
no personal creed, or the 
easy assumption of handy, 
ready-made ones
Inability to cope with life 
metaphorically; low or no 
tolerance for ambiguity or 
uncertainty; preference for 
simple, imposed, or repeti­
tive activities




Behavioral Scale (continued) 
+ 1 0 -1
12. An open accepting orienta­
tion toward reality; prob­
lem-centering, with deri­
vation of pleasure from 
challenging tasks and ad­
versity
13. No exaggerated reliance on 
spatial identity; no appar­
ent compulsive need to be 
seen, heard, etc.
14. Distinct willingness (and 
courage) to live (and to 
fulfill) own individuality 
and uniqueness; belief 
that society's managers 
are persons like oneself ; 
immersion in life without 
cynicism or anxiety over 
outcome; absence of hiding 
behind facades
15. Interest in and concern 
about most aspects of own 
life; transcending goals 
and values
16. No dichotomization of intel­
lectual-affective (experi­
ential) life; reluctance to 
rubricize; empathy and sen­
sitivity in classifying or 
categorizing
17. A full immersion and in­
volvement in the now
Distantiative orientation 
toward reality; talks about 
problems rather than com­
mitting oneself to achieve­
ment in spite of them
Exaggerated reliance on 
spatial identity; apparent 
compulsive need to be physi­
cally confirmed by others
Attempts to live "anony­
mously" by being "only a 
little man"; belief in the 
wisdom of society's mana­
gers as superior to one's 
own; anxious retreat or de­
pressive resignation to 
helplessness; fear or indi­
viduality; hiding behind 
facades
Pervasive indifference; 
inactive or passive value 




other either-or orientations 
pervade thinking and behav­
ior
A putting-off of the begin­
ning of "real" life ("things 
will be better when..."); a 
fatalistic attitude toward 
time ("why start anything 
now when...")
(Continued on next page)
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Appendix III (continued) 
Behavioral Scale (continued)
+2 + 1 0 -2
18. High self-valuation; high 
self-esteen
19. Basic trust of others and 
of the world; realistic 
optimism
20. Competitiveness; belief
that success in any endeavor 
(even the required ones) is 
a consequence primarily of 
hard work, and of creative 
well-intentioned commitment
Low self-valuation; low 
self-esteem
Basic mistrust; suspicious­
ness of others' motives 
and intentions, and of the 
general trustworthiness of 
the world; unrealistic 
pessimism
Abhorrence of competition; 
belief that success is un­
likely, but that if it does 
come, it will be primarily 
as a result of fate or 
chance (or luck, or of one's 





An articulated feeling 
that life is being lived 
by self-initiation rather 
than simply happening to 
the individual; evidence 
of being and feeling the 
agent of one's powers; 
having definite goals and 
being able to work now at 
achieving them
Evidence of competency 
(effectance) and feelings 
of competency; productiv­
ity in some culturally 
worthwhile endeavor; over­
all active (achieving) vs. 
passive (talks about prob­
lems and difficulties, 
etc.) orientations
Evidence of true engage­
ment with others ; open­
ness to rel “dness with 
other people, without de­
pendency upon them for 
identity or direction; B- 
love (Maslow, 1962) for 
others; or, commitment to 
active perpetuation or 
achievement of value-goals
Full participation and 
involvement in the now; 
spoil Lanei cy ; absence of 
defensive constrictions 
and constraints; full use 
of one's powers; congru­
ency of actions and values
Feelings or expressions 
that life is happening to 
the individual rather than 
being self-initiated; 
expressions of not being 
or feeling the agent of 
one's powers; absence of 
definite goals or distinct 
inability to work now in 
order to achieve them
Evidence or expressions 
of incompetency; distinct 
lack of productivity in 
any culturally worthwhile 
endeavor; over-all passive 
orientations
Marketing-orientation 
toward others ; lack of 
true engagement; absence 
of openness to others, or 
dependency upon them for 
identity or direction; 
D-love; no active commit­
ment to the fulfillment 
of value-goals
Lack of involvement and 
participation in the now; 
lack or spontaneity; pres­
ence of defensive constric­
tions and constraints; lack 
of full control of own 
powers ; incongruency of 
actions and values




5. Recognition and peisonal 
reconciliation with ulti­
mate subjectivity; inter­
nal locus of evaluation; 
acceptance of the fact 
that one's life is one's 
own responsibility
6. A personal style or idiom 
anchored in the cognizance 
of role-playing and other 
socio-cultural imperatives; 
insight into limiting ef­
fects of habitual responses; 
a personal creed, thesis,
or philosophy of life
Reliance on objectivity and 
delusions of contact with 
"real" socio-moral facts; 
external loci of evaluation; 
avoidance of acceptance of 
the fact that one's life is 
one's own responsibility
Lack of a personal style or 
idiom; little or no cogni­
zance of the limitations of 
role-playing, other socio­
cultural imperatives, or 
habitual responses ; no evi­
dence of having a personal 





-2 -1 0 + 1 + 2
1. Obligatory, marketing- 
oriented relationships; 
stereotyped interpersonal 
relationships or social 
isolation; inability to 
engage or approach
2. No real achievement or 
sense of achievement, but 
many reasons (external) 
for not achieving
3. Best of life in the past 
or in the future
4. No concern, or unhealthy 
concern over identity
5. Low self-esteem honestly 
appraised
6. Basic mistrust
7. Abhors competition, or 
pretends to value, but 
no evidence of really 
competing at anything
8. Denies embarrassment or 
shame, or amnesic with 
regard to such experiences
9. Passive religious orien­
tations, or none
10. General assumptions of 
objectivity
11. Denies own experiences 





Active achievement and 
accomplishment
Immersed in the now





Likes to compete, or is 
actively engaged in doing 
so
Openness to experience of 
shame or embarrassment
Active religious orienta­
tions, even if atheistic
Accepts ultimate subjec­
tivity
Ability to have and accept 
own experiences




-2 -1 0 +1 +2
12. Poor insight into self Good insight into self and
and social processes social processes




1. Talk five minutes uninterrupted about any interesting or 
exciting life experience you may have had.
2. Groups you belong to, or identify with.
3. Describe the person closest to you. Describe the most 
recent encounter with that person.
4. Occupational or career choice? Pleased by the prospect?
5. Recount your yesterday from the time you got up until 
you went to bed.
6. Major conflicts or problems today. IThat concerns you?
7. Do you ever wonder who you are or what kind of a person 
you are? Do you have a feeling of knowing who you are 
and where you’re going?
8. Do you like yourself? In what way?
9. Do you believe that people are basically good and well- 
intentioned toward you?
10. Do you like to compete with others? For what kinds of 
goals or rewards?
11. Describe the most recent situation in which you were 
embarrassed or ashamed. Why were you? How did you feel 
afterward and what did you do as a consequence?
12. \«Jhat do you think is wrong with our world? Right?
13. What gives you the greatest happiness or joy in life? 
Example,
14. What activities are most boring or least interesting to 
you?
15. What do you believe to be your responsibility toward your 
fellow-man? Example.
16. Do you like to be alone? Recent example.




+ 1 + 5
Strong evidence of many or 
all of these four character­
istics: reliance on instruc­
tor (or others) for task 
definition; lack of confi­
dence in own competence; un­
pleasant, trying, burden­
some, anxious task attitudes; 
absence of "evidence of an 
I"
Strong evidence of the 
following: ability to de­
fine standards and pro­
cedures for performing the 
task independently of 
instructor (or others); a 
positive attitude toward 
one's own competence; 
enjoyment of the tasks; 
"evidence of an I"




1.* One’s work is
2. Being alone
_3. The most difficult decisions in life 
When a person is a failure
5. Other people think I
I frequently worry that
7, It is usually hard for me to
8. Most people one meets 
I usually feel that
10. I could be more productive if
11. I would like life better
12. I'Jhen people watch me
^Underscored numbers indicate stems that were retained; 
others were discarded when an item analysis revealed their 




1. Ralph Andrews, a university sophomore student, felt that 
he had worked hard and had done a pretty good job on a term 
paper for one of his courses. But the professor had given 
him a very low mark on the paper, for a number of reasons 
which the professor had pointed out on the paper. On his way 
to discuss with the professor what he felt to be the profes­
sor's excessively high standards in grading the paper, Ralph 
met Tony Pauling, a classmate.
A. Reproduce Ralph's conversation with Tony.
B. Reproduce Ralph's conversation with the professor.
2. Complete this story: Richard Downs, who had been first 
in his high school class scholastically, was dismayed by his 
discovery today that his midterm grades for his first semes­
ter at the university had been "average" or below in all of 
his courses but one, in which he had made an "A." He was 
contemplating what he should do about the problem, and how he 
was going to explain it to the folks back home.
3. Complete this story: Robert Hayes and Bonnie Rolf had 
"gone steady" since they were juniors in the same high school. 
Now, attending the same university, they both planned to grad­
uate at the next commencement--Bonnie with a degree in soci­
ology and Robert in pre-med. They had frequently discussed 
what they should do about their relationship in view of the 
fact that Robert would be going on to med school next fall; 
they both realized that they could probably not arrange the 
necessary finances to marry before Robert completed his medi­
cal training. In recent weeks, Robert had frequently seen 
Bonnie having coffee with Ed Wilks, another sociology major. 
Nevertheless, Robert was shocked when Bonnie told him she 
wanted to break off their relationship.
4. Complete this story: Bill travers brought Evelyn Weeks, 
a girl he had met at the university where they were both 
sophomoresj to his family's home during the vacation period.
He told his parents of their intention to get married in the 
spring. As soon as the opportunity arose, his parents took 
Bill aside and told him how much they disapproved of his choice 
of mate, and that they would naturally have to withdraw their 
financial assistance to him if he went ahead with his plans
to marry the girl.
(Continued on next page)
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Appendix IX (continued) 
Story Stems (continued)
5. The infant child of a young couple became choked on a 
piece of candy shortly after the noon meal. Nothing they 
could do dislodged the piece of candy. They feared that the 
infant was unable to breathe and would die if something were 
not done immediately. They decided to rush the child to 
the hospital in their car. Enroute, travelling at a high 
rate of speed, their car struck a second-grade child at a 
school crossing. Either the impact or the excitement dis­
lodged the piece of candy from the infant's throat, but the 
child that had been struck by the car was seriously injured 
and was not expected, by the attending doctors, to live.
The four parents were together at the hospital when they 
heard that news. Reproduce the conversation that might have 
ensued between the four parents.
6. Harold Adams, a university student, was walking alone 
along a street in a large city with which he was unfamiliar. 
It was winter. A shabbily dressed man approached him and 
asked for money to buy a meal. Complete the story.
7. On his 35th birthday, Carl Tompkins was emotionally 
struck by the disparity between the dreams of his youth and 
his present accomplishments. He thought about his dilemma 
all during the day. Early in the evening, after helping 
put their three children to bed, he told his wife he was 
going out for a pack of cigarettes. She was worried about 
him because he had been acting what seemed to her "strangely" 
all day. She asked him what was troubling him. He replied 
that he'd talk to her about it when he got back. Reproduce 
their conversation.
8. A man pauses before a closed door. Inside is his son, 
who has been paroled to the father, after being arrested for 
a crime, with the stipulation that the father establish in 
his son’s mind a firm sense of right and wrong. Reproduce 
the conversation between father and son that you think might
•? cV» 1 c a1*> TTO
